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Aspects of the Perry Mission and the Opening of Japan

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ASPECTS OF THE PERRY MISSION AND THE OPENING OF JAPAN

by

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VITA

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CHAPTER I

THE OPENINGS OF JAPAN

The Editor of Chicago History, Paul M. Angle, wishing to commemorate the one-hundredth anniversary of the opening of Japan, devoted most of the pages of the last number of the magazine to Commodore Perry and the official record of the 1854 voyage to Japan: Narrative of The Expedition of an American Squadron to the China Seas and Japan, Performed in the Years 1852, 1853, and 1854, under the Command of Commodore M. C. Perry, United States Navy, by Order of the Government of the United States. Compiled from the original notes and journals of Commodore Perry and his officers, at his request, and under his supervision, by Francis L. Hawks, D.D., LL.D. Published by order of Congress of the United States, Washington, 1856.[1] Many thousands of copies were printed for distribution by the congressmen.[2] The Narrative fills one large volume and two smaller volumes with special reports. Chicago History describes these and illustrates its article with contemporary lithographs of Matthew Calbraith Perry, his famous squadron, and some scenes of the great event.

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1 Chicago History, III, (Winter, 1953-1954), Number 10, p. 290. The article "Perry Opens Japan to the World," runs from p. 289 to 303, and describes the copy of the Narrative in the Chicago Historical Society collection.

2 Ibid. p. 289-290. Here it is stated that "10,000 'extra copies' were ordered for the House of Representatives and 500 'additional Copies' for Perry." We shall see below, note 7, that the Senate ordered 5,000 additional copies for its members and 250 copies for Perry.

The printing of Perry's report leads to several important facts. The first is the importance of the event in the minds of the Senators and the desire to make it as public as possible. Another fact is that the Senators promoting the printing were from the South. A third point is the question of the cost of the printing of the report and many other reports of the Army and Navy men engaged in explorations of our West, South and Central America, and Islands of the Pacific.

Regarding the publication of Perry's papers, Senator John Slidell of Louisiana submitted the following resolution to the Senate of December 6, 1854, which was unanimously passed:

> Resolved: That the President be requested to communicate to the Senate, if in his opinion it is not incompatible with the public interest, the instructions, correspondence, and other documents relating to the naval expedition to Japan, and the proceedings and negotiations resulting in a treaty with the Government thereof.[3]

Apparently there was nothing incompatible with the public interest, since the papers and a report of the Secretary of the Navy according to the resolution were turned over to the Senate by President Pierce.[4] On February 1, 1855, Senator James M. Mason of Virginia moved that they be referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and that the said Committee should report in favor of printing them after consideration.[5]

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3 The Congressional Globe, Vol. XXX, 2nd Sess. 33 Cong., p. 15.

4 Ibid., p. 502.

5 Ibid.

The Committee did not take long for its consideration, because on the next day, February 2, Senator Mason reported that the correspondence and papers had been given to the Committee and the Committee had informed him that it was desireable to have them printed. He added: "And I understand, if the order is made today, it will be ready on Monday or Tuesday at the furthest, I move that it be printed. The motion was agreed to."[6] On the following Monday, February 5, Mason had some additional remarks to make.

> It has been strongly impressed on me since that we should print an additional number. I ask, in order that it may not be referred to the Committee on Printing, the unanimous consent of the Senate to move that five thousand additional copies be printed. I have consulted the members of the Committee on Printing, and they assent to it. There was no objection.[7]

Three days after this on February 8, Senator Judah P. Benjamin of Louisiana, a member of the Committee on Printing, reported that the document to be printed amounted to nearly two hundred pages and because of a standing rule could not be bound unless it reached two hundred and fifty pages. He continued: "As this is of some value, and one which all the Senators would like to keep, I ask the unanimous consent of the Senate to submit a motion that these copies which have been ordered for the use of the Senate be bound."[8] Senator Robert W. Johnson of Arkansas objected that the proposition ought to be referred to the Committee on Printing, and this was done.

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6 Ibid., p. 439.

7 Ibid., p. 567.

8 Ibid., p. 629.

On February 14 Senator Johnson told the Senate that the Committee on Printing was in favor of the motion, it was in favor of binding the report, and also in favor of delivering two hundred and fifty copies to Commodore Perry.[9] This in time brought up the question of the cost of printing. On March 26, 1856, Senator Benjamin Fitzpatrick of Alabama, a member of the Committee on Printing was called upon to explain the large expenditures and the increasing costs of printing and the large deficiencies in the funds allotted to the Committee. He justified the acts of the Committee by stating that "some of the reports of expeditions, the printing of which has caused this large deficiency, are valuable - for instance, the expedition to Japan and the Pacific railroad surveys."[10] Then the members of the Senate engaged in discussions of the relative value of many of the reports, surveys, chartings, and lithographs, and the number of volumes which should be given to each. Since these were made by Army and Navy men there are indications of rivalry between the two departments and there is evidence of the interest of the Government in the exploration of many places in the world.

The Senate and House did their part in making known to the country the name of Perry and the opening of Japan. The newspapers and magazines carried articles and pictures in praise of the enterprise. Perry's name

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9 Ibid., p. 719.

10 The Congressional Globe, Debates, etc., 1st and 2nd Sess. 34th Cong. p. 705-706. Fitzpatrick argued that there were four volumes of the Perry report while other reports which he mentions ran to as high as twenty volumes. As stated above the copy in the Chicago Historical Society is in three volumes; there was also a one volume edition.

became a household word and the Narrative was widely discussed. People grew more interested in seeing some Japanese and Chinese and samples of their cultures and products. Since that time the Perry expedition report has been used by many writers as a source book and the event has taken its place in the textbooks studied in American schools. The Japanese also considered the arrival of Perry as a great moment in their history and they dedicated a monument to him in what was then Yeddo but is now Tokyo. From 1855 on until Dewey became the important naval hero, Perry and Navy prestige in the Pacific were synonymous. The islands of the Pacific and the oriental lands were always a source of wonder to the people of America. To the minds of the traders and business men and expansionists they became objects for exploitation.

Perry indeed opened Japan but did he merely rekindle interest in the Pacific? Did he merely focus the attention of Americans on one place in a much larger picture? Did he suddenly become the central figure in a drama of trade which had long been in progress? The answers leads to a much longer story of our interest in the Orient. This aspect of the opening of Japan as an item in a longer story is now coming to light with the studies of more recent historians, even though at present histories of our foreign relations still contain the old idea that Perry was the discoverer of Japan and its possibilities for trade.[11] It seems true that the way to study the opening of

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11 Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, 4th Edition, New York, 1950, states on page 321, note 5, that "not until 1831 was the word China mentioned in a public presidential message or paper; and not until 1852 was Japan referred to." But on page 339 in the bibliography he refers to the proposal of Captain David Porter to President Madison, regarding the opening of Japan in 1815.

Japan is to study the opening of China, and the way to China was across the Atlantic and around Africa, because trade had been going on in this way for seventy years before Perry.

As is well known explorers during the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries had made Europeans aware of a Great Khan somewhere in the Orient. Columbus when he came to America had a letter to the Khan. The Portuguese during the fifteenth century had made great sea explorations down the coast of Africa in search of a way to the East and finally sent Vasco da Gama around the Cape of Good Hope to India. They conquered western India by 1515 and soon their ships were in Chinese waters trying to establish trade relations.[12] But the orientals refused to let western ideas into their area, although they traded together regularly. The Chinese, Siamese, Japanese and others had their own methods of trade. The Spaniards arrived in the Philippines in 1543 to claim the Islands and later to begin trading with the Philippinos, who in turn traded with both Chinese and Japanese junks. The Dutch settled a colony on Formosa in 1622 but were expelled in 1650, although by this time they had already made a trade agreement and had put in a trading post at Nagasaki. The British tried to shoot their way into Canton in 1635 and to force the trade of the East India Company on the city, but as they could not make any agreement they departed leaving the Chinese disgusted and resentful.[13]

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12 John W. Foster, American Diplomacy in the Orient, New York, 1903, p. 4.

13 Ibid., p. 5-6.

The first opening of Japan to foreign ideas was made by the Christian missionaries. In 1542 a Portuguese ship visited the Islands. The Japanese opened their doors and were willing to trade with the men from the west. In that year St. Francis Xavier set out from Portugal for his missionary work in India. After organising the missions there he went seeking gould in the East Indies and heard of the Japanese. He arrived at Kagoshima in Japan on August 15, 1549.[14] The islanders readily took to the Christian ideas as he visited many of the cities of the hermit empire. The rulers permitted the priests to instruct and baptise their subjects. When Xavier left for China in 1551 there were 3,000 Christians.[15] By 1582 there were 200,000 and two hundred and fifty Catholic churches. So enthusiastic were the Japanese to learn of the world outside that in 1582 three nobles made the voyage to Lisbon and then through Europe to visit the Pope.[16] They convinced the European monarchs that Japan

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14 James Brodrick, S.J., Saint Francis Xavier (1506-1552), The Wicklow Press, New York, 1952, p. 360. Father Brodrick has a long chapter on the Japanese and letters of Xavier describing the work of the first Jesuits.

15 These statistics are taken from the article on Japan in the Catholic Encyclopedia.

16 C. Raymond Beasley, F.R.G.S., Voyages and Travels mainly during the 16th and 17th Centuries, 2 Volumes, Westminster, 1903, Vol. II, p. 22-23 has the diary of Jan Huyghen van Linschoten, describing the famous event of the first appearance in Europe of the Japanese. According to this certain Jesuits brought three princes of Japan to Goa In India. The three were under sixteen years of age and were dressed like the fathers. The three went from Goa in 1584 to Lisbon then to the Spanish court of Philip II who at the time was also ruling Portugal and her possessions. They then went to Rome to visit Pope Sixtus V. They travelled all through Italy receiving many gifts. They returned by way of Madrid and Lisbon, sailed around Africa and arrived in Goa in 1587 wearing gold and silver Italian clothes. Their next stop was China. They wrote a book in Spanish recounting their experience and attributing all their happiness to the Jesuits.

would probably all become Catholic and on their return to Japan in 1590 narrated the wonders of Europe to the Shogun. In 1597 there were 300,000 Christians in various cities of Japan. In this same year the persecution of Japanese Catholics began in earnest when the ruler at Nagasaki had twenty-six crucified because some trader told him that the Christians intended to overthrow the government and make themselves rulers of all of the Islands.

The Dutch traders of the Dutch East India Company arrived at Nagasaki in 1600 when their ships needed repairs.[17] They were Protestants and as such berated the Catholics. This was the first indication to the Japanese that there was a division among the Christians. The Bonzes who were always antagonistic to the Japanese Catholics and the priests, and the Buddhists saw opportunities to get rid of the hated new religion. They were of the opinion that the Dutch were not Christian and therefore would not interfere with the old religions. Besides the Japanese were very curious about the repairing of the ships and the building of new ships. They imprisoned English captain, Adams, of the Dutch ship and forced the Dutch to remain on the little island of Deshima, which had been built in the Bay of Nagasaki. Soon other Dutch and British ships returned. The British were allowed to build ships and begin shipbuilding in a number of Japanese ports in 1613.

The national hatred of the Dutch for the Spanish and Portuguese was combined with the British hate. The Buddhists, Shintoists and other native religious leaders added their accusations against the Christians who by this

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17 This was the Adams expedition soon to be described.

time meant to the Japanese the Portuguese and Spaniards. From 1614 on to 1643 persecution after persecution was visited upon the Japanese Christians. In 1622 fifty-two were beheaded in Nagasaki, fourteen of them Jesuit priests. During this time at least 111 Jesuits were martyred, to say nothing of missionaries of other orders.[18] To be a Christian was made a crime punishable by death. The hundred years of the Jesuit missionary labors were ended.

Meantime, too, all Spanish and Portuguese traders were forbidden entrance under penalty of death. The final decrees of the Emperor in 1637 closed the gates of Japan to all foreigners. They did away with all trade and contact with Europeans, except the Dutch Protestants, who were allowed to trade on Deshima but not allowed to walk a half mile further to Nagasaki.[19] They

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18 Synopsis Historiae Societatis Jesu, Ratisbon, 1914, column 663. Three Japanese Jesuit scholastics were crucified in 1586, 1596, 1597, and are now canonized saints; twenty Japanese Jesuits of this period have been beatified with those fathers coming from other countries; others have been made venerable, or servants of God by various Popes.

19 Foster, American Diplomacy in the Orient, 12-16, describes the island of Deshima: "The island of Deshima, artificially built in the harbor of Nagasaki, six hundred feet long and two hundred and forty feet wide, was surrounded by a high stone wall, which permitted only a distant view of its inmates. It was connected with the mainland by a stone bridge guarded by Japanese police and had only one other outlet, the sea gate. Both of these gates were closed and guarded by night. In this veritable prison eleven Dutchmen were allowed to reside. They were occasionally permitted to pass beyond its walls for exercise ... accompanied by a numerous police retinue. Owing to the bitter hostility of the Dutch to the Catholic missionaries and merchants, the Japanese supposed that the Christians worshipped two Christs, and when it was found that both sects acknowledged the same God the Dutch at Deshima were prohibited from observing the Sabbath...." The Japanese servants could not remain overnight, and no government officials were ever admitted to the island. The Japanese took the cargoes, sold them at their prices, and gave their unchecked accounts to the Dutch president.

were to have not more than eleven men in their post and could have only two ships enter the harbor in a year. Actually from that time until the advent of Perry, the laws prohibited any foreigner from entering and forbade all Japanese to have contact with the Europeans. The position of the Dutch in the harbor on Deshima brings up the question of whether Japan was ever really closed or ever really open to outside contacts during over two hundred years.

How the opening of Japan to the Dutch and English merchants took place and the first agreements or treaties that were made between these countries and Japan is an interesting story.

In 1598 the Dutch merchants hired William Adams as a pilot for one of their fleets sailing for the Orient.[20] The five ships went around South America and after some trading in Chile and Peru made their way to Japan. Many had died in battles with islanders or from plagues during the nearly five months voyage across the Pacific. When they arrived at Bungo, only six were able to stand.[21] A Jesuit and some Christians came out from Nagasaki and acted as interpreters, "Which was ill for us, they being our mortal enemies," Adams says. He then explains the hospitality and the care that was given. The emperor heard of the arrival and ordered Adams to Yeddo. He was questioned about the war between the Dutch and Spanish and had him put in prison. In a bargain Adams was kept in what he called prison but the fleet was allowed to

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20 Samuel Purchas, B.D., Hakluytus Posthumus, or, Purchas His Pilgrimes, 20 Volumes, Glasgow and New York, 1905, Vol. II, p. 327-346, has two letters of Adams.

21 Ibid., p. 331-332.

sail. Adams had to supervise the building of three ships in five years time and was given pay. In 1609 he built a ship of one hundred tons which the Japanese used to trade with other islands, and Adams was given "a living, like unto a Lordship in England, with eightie or ninetie husbandmen, who are as my servants and slaves."[22]

In 1611 two ships came to Deshima from Holland and were received at the court in great splendor, although the Emperor wanted to know why none had come the preceding year according to the agreement. The agreement was apparently the one that had been brought back to Holland by Richard Cocks who was returning from the 1609 expedition, and which was copied by Hakluyt and translated into English.[23]

> The Copie of a Letter sent by the Emperour of Japan, unto the King of Holland, by the ship called the Red Lion, with Arrowes, which arrived in the Texel, the two and twentieth of July, 1610.
>
> I, Emperour and King of Japan, wish to the King of Holland, who hath sent from so farre Countries to visit me, greeting.
>
> I rejoyce greatly in your writing and sending unto me, and wish that our Countries were neerer the one to the other, whereby wee might continue and increase the friendship begunne betwixt us through your Majesties presence, whom I imagine in conceit to see, in respect I an unknowne unto your Majestie, and that your love toward me is manifested through your liberalitie in honouring mee with foure presents, whereof though I had no need, yet coming in your name I received them in great worth, and hold them in good esteeme.
>
> And further, whereas the Hollanders your Majesties

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22 Ibid., p. 337-338.

23 Ibid., Vol. III, p. 548-550 have this letter.

Subjects desire to trade with their shipping in my Countrey, which is of little value and small, and to traffique with my Subjects, and desire to have their abiding neere unto my Court, whereby in person I might help and assist them; which cannot bee as now through the inconvenience of the Countrey; ye notwithstanding I will not neglect, as alreadie I have beene, to be carefull of them, and to give in charge to all my Governours and Subjects, that in what placed and Havens in what part soever they shall arrive, they shall shew them all favour and friendship to their Persons, Ships and Merchandise: wherein your Majestie or your Subjects need not to doubt or feare ought to the Contrarie. For they may come as freely as if they came to your Majesties owne Havens and Countries; and so may remayne in my Countrie to trade. And the friendship begunne betwixt mee and my Subjects with you shall never bee impayred on my behalfe, but augmented and increased.

I am partly ashamed that your Majestie (whose Name and Renowme through your valorous Deeds is spred throughout the whole World) should cause your Subjects to come from so farre Countries into a Countrey so unfitting as this is, to visit me, and to offer unto mee such friendships as I have not deserved. But considering that your affection hath beene the cause thereof, I could not but friendly entertayne your Subjects, and yeeld to their requests; whereof this shall serve as testimonie, That they in all places, Countries, and Ilands under mine obedience may trade and traffique, and build Houses serviceable and needfull for their Trade and Merchandises, where they may trade without any hinderance, at their pleasure aswell in time to come as for the present, so that no man shall doe them any wrong: And I will mayntayne and defend them as mine owne Subjects.

I promise likewise, that the persons which I understand shall bee left heere, shall now and at all times be held as recommended unto me, and in all things to favour them, whereby your Majestie shall find us as your Friends and Neighbours.

For other matters passed betwixt me and your Majesties Servants, which would bee too long heere to repeate, I referre my selfe unto them.

This letter, the first sent from the Emperor of Japan to the Prince of Orange was apparently the agreement through which the Dutch were allowed

all the privileges of the Japanese trade on the island of Deshima. To maintain this small foothold the traders had to bear exile and insult for more than two centuries.

As for the opening of trade with Japan by the English, John Saris claimed that he was the first to enter Japan. He was captain of the Clove and had sailed in many seas before arriving in Japan in 1613 from the Molucca Islands. Arriving at Nagasaki on June 11, 1613, he presented letters of "our Kings to the King of Firando."[24] The King would not open them until William Adams arrived. Saris described many things in Japan, including the presence of "Popish idolators," and the crucified Christians still in the public places.[25] Adams translated the request of the English for trade privileges, and also translated into English the Emperor's reply to the King's letter and his thanks for the gifts. Besides, he translated from the Japanese the list of privileges as follows:

> Privileges granted by Ogoshosama, Emperor of Japan, unto the Right Worshipfull Sir Thomas Smith, Knight, Governour, and others the Honorable and Worshipfull Adventurers to the East-Indies.
>
> 1 Inprimis, Wee give free licence to the subjects of the King of Great Britaine, vis. Sir Thomas Smith, Governour, and Company of the East-Indian Merchants and Adventurers, for ever, safely to come into any of our Port of our Empire of Japan, with their shippes and merchandises, without any hinderance to them or their goods. And to abide, buy, sell, and barter, according to their owne manner, with all Nations: to tarry heere as long as they thinke good, and to depart at their pleasure.

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24 Ibid., Vol. III, p. 443.

25 Ibid., Vol. III, p. 461.

2 Item, Wee grant unto them freedome of Customs, for all such merchandizes as either they now have brought, or hereafter shall bring into our Kingdomes, or shall from hence transport to any forraigne part. And doe authorise those ships that hereafter shall arrive, and come from England, to proceed to present sale of commodities, without further comming or sending up to our Court.

3 Item, If any of their shippes shall happen to be in danger of shipwracke, Wee will our Subjects not only to assist them, but that such part of shippe and goods as shall be saved, be returned to their Captaine, or Cape Merchant, or their assignes. And that they shall or may build one house or more for themselves in any part of Our Empire, where they shall thinke fittest. And at their departure to make sale thereof at their pleasure.

4 Item, If any of the English Merchants or other shall depart this life, within our Dominions, the goods of the deceased shall remain at the dispose of the Cape Merchant. And that all offences committed by them shall be punished by the said Cape Merchant, according to his discretion: and Our Lawes to take hold of their persons or goods.

5 Item, Wee will that yee Our subjects trading with them for any of their commodities, pay them for the same, according to the agreement, without delay, or returne of their wares againe unto them.

6 Item, For such commodities as they have now brought, or shall hereafter bring, fitting for Our service and proper use: Wee will that no arrest bee made thereof, but that the price bee made with the Cape Merchant, according as they may sell to others, and present payment upon the delivery of the goods.

7 Item, If in discovery of other countries for Trade, and returne of their shippes, they shall need men or Victualls, Wee will that Yee Our subjects furnish them for their money, as their need shall require.

8 And that without other Passe-port, they shall and may set out upon the discovery of Yeadso, or any other part, in or about Our Empire.

From our Castle in Surunga, this forst day of the ninth

moneth, and in the eighteenth yeere of Our Dary (Raigne), according to our Computation. Sealed with our Broadseale, &c.

Under-written:

Minna. Mottono.[26]

During the Eighteenth Century the big trading port in the Orient was Canton. As far as Europeans were concerned Japan had little to offer. According to Pritchard in March, 1698, the newly formed French Compagnie de la Chine sent its first ship to Canton, where it arrived in November.[27] This was in competition to the Old London East India Company. This latter was then reorganised and became the English East India Company. In 1717 some English malcontents formed an English Ostend Company. The new rival met opposition from the Dutch East India Company as well as from the French and English. The Danish and Swedish merchants banded together in the Danish East India Company, which had opened trade at Canton in 1731. All the rivals wanted to control the tea being sold in Europe. Naturally, there were many smugglers and wild-cat companies plying their trade during this century. British captains were hired

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26 Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 467-468. This treaty lasted until 1639 when the British were again excluded from all ports of Japan. A comparison between these early treaties and that made by Commodore Perry as given in the Appendix will show that he obtained little more than was given by the Shogun to the Dutch and British and that the minds of the Shoguns from the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth centuries had changed very little. It is speculation to say that if Perry had entered Japan without the armed steam ships he might have obtained fewer concessions or perhaps none at all.

27 E. H. Pritchard, "The Struggle for Control of the China Trade during the Eighteenth Century," Pacific Historical Review, III (No. 3, 1934), pp. 280-295. The last pages of this article are given to tables of trade. For England's difficulties with the China trade after 1792, see Herbert J. Wood, "England, China, and the Napoleonic Wars," Pacific Historical Review, IX (June, 1940), pp. 139-157.

until a law forbade them to go east in the service of other companies in 1732. One after another the British eliminated the Danes, Swedes, Prussians, and finally the Dutch and French in 1792, and Britain became the head of the tea business on the continent and in her colonies. The Americans sent ships regularly to Canton from 1784, as will be shown later.

The Russians had had some dealings with the Japanese, but these were more in the nature of land-grabbing than attempts to gain trade advantages. In 1792, Catherine II thought that some of the northern Japanese Islands would be good places to colonise.[28] Attempts had been made to take over Sakhalin, Yezo, and several of the Kuriles in earlier years without success. Now Catherine II found another way to begin negotiations. She had a Lieutenant Laxman return some shipwrecked Japanese sailors to their home, in the hopes that the friendly act would bring some friendly relations. Nothing was accomplished, except that the wary Japanese shortly afterwards removed some boundary posts which the Russians had placed in the northern islands. Five years later a Russian sloop of war, with the good English name Diana, made an attempt to survey the Kuriles Islands and continued to Yezo. This came to an end when the Japanese seized Captain Golowin and some officers of the ship and kept them in prison for several years.

United States merchant ships were in the Japanese waters during the Napoleonic wars, but in "irregular" enterprises. The Dutch had hired them to

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28 Hosea Ballou Morse and Harley Farnsworth MacNair, Far Eastern International Relations, Cambridge, 1931, p. 294.

continue their transporting of goods and had put them under the Dutch flag. One of these, the Elisa, commanded by Captain Stewart, sailed into Deshima in 1797, but several years later when the same captain attempted to trade there on his own account under the American flag, he was refused admission. When the British became aware of the Dutch trickery and when her ships could be released from the European scene, they sent a warship, H.M.S. Phaeton, to Nagasaki.[29] This was disguised as a Dutch ship and was the first warship to enter the port in modern times. It arrived in August, 1808, and caused consternation in the port. The Japanese governor of the port, Matsudaira, was so angry and humiliated that he committed harakiri. The Dutch officials at Deshima, seeing that the Japanese might possibly open up trade to the British, told the Japanese that the British queen was a Portuguese princess, and then devised a plan to have all of the crew of the Phaeton killed. The plan failed.

The Empress of China was the first vessel flying the American flag to engage in the Canton trade. It left New York in February, 1784, and sailed to the Cape Verde Islands, rounded the Cape of Good Hope and by July was in the Straits of Sunda. In August it was in the Canton River with its cargo of furs, lead, wine and ginsing, and Spanish dollars for purchasing. By 1789 nineteen American ships had visited the port and by 1800 the average number going was between twenty and thirty.[30] According to Pritchard's statistics the value of

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29 Inazo Nitobe and others, Western Influences in Modern Japan, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1931, p. 415.

30 Pritchard, "Struggle for Chinese Trade," Pacific Historical Review, III, pp. 292-294.

the goods exported from Canton in 1784-1785 by American ships was 79,320 and in 1800-1801 it had increased to 1,800,000. By 1806-1807 the value was 3,091,680. The goods carried into Canton in 1784 amounted to 136,450, in 1800-1801 to 757,750, and a little less in 1806-1807.[31]

In the course of these years, suddenly in 1794, the item opium began to appear on the list of American cargoes. Opium as a valuable trade item must have been known to American shippers, so it may have been smuggled long before it got on the records. Stelle says:

> And the fact that opium was contraband was no deterrent to the initiation of the American traffic in the drug. In the first years of the Republic the circumvention of the alien customs regulations was, if not an American virtue, at least a patriotic failing. Smuggling was an accepted method of American commercial enterprise, and the technique was early introduced into the China trade.[32]

Stelle then proceeds to prove his statements.

In 1804 Charles Cabot sailing a merchant ship for the Perkins Company indicated the possibilities and his employers indicated other possibilities. Cabot heard that the Bengal opium could be sold for a big profit in the East Indies and hence went to Penang to get some. His employers wrote to tell him

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31 Ibid., pp. 292-295.

32 C. C. Stelle, "American Trade in Opium to China, Prior to 1820," Pacific Historical Review, IX, (1940), p. 427. Opium or berch is mentioned only four times in the twenty volumes of Purchas His Pilgrimes in spite of the very great number of voyages described; Vol. III, p. 285, mentions it as an object of trade; in Vol. IV, p. 35, Captain William Finch inquired of the price of it in Malva; in Vol. VIII, p. 266, William Biddulph in 1600 notes that "some take berch or opium," referring to the Turks, and p. 146, George Sandys in 1610 says that the Turks are "incredible takers of Opium." Stelle has references to the works on opium and the opium trade, p. 425-426, note 6.

that he should have gone to the Mediterranean, that is to Smyrna, to get Turkish opium instead of Indian. Neither the English East India Company nor English private vessels were allowed to carry opium to China. For this reason the Americans had practically a monopoly. In 1805, an American brig, Pennsylvania, left Philadelphia, went to the Mediterranian and on to Smyrna where it took on fifty chests of opium for Batavia. A few months later another ship from Baltimore and one from Philadelphia bought loads for Canton. They were the pioneers, the Entan and the Sylph, though other American ships had brought opium from Smyrna to the United States, which eventually reached China. The Perkins Company for many years were the largest gainers in the Canton opium trade. They had agents in various places to buy the drug and by 1817 were dealing in thousands of pounds, 40,000 of which were sent to Canton in November of that year. They bought both Smyrna and Bengal opium.

Others joined in the trade among them John Jacob Astor who brought back 15,000 pounds to Boston for reshipment to Canton in 1816. This had come from Smyrna by way of London. Next, Astor bought it in Persia, and found after it reached Canton that it was unsaleable. Astor then turned to the India and Turkish kind. But in those years, 1817 and 1818, the Americans carried so much opium into China, one third of what was consumed in the country, that the market was glutted and prices went down. In his summary Stelle says:

> In the period prior to 1820 Americans had developed a profitable monoply in the traffic in Turkish opium; had experimented briefly with Persian opium; had carried to China quantities of Persian and Turkish drug sufficient to threaten the East India Company's interest in the trade; and had made far from insignificant use of opium in their

commerce to China. They had not, however, achieved any direct share in the profits of the Indian drug at Canton.[33]

The opium trade was one item in the expanding trade between ships from the United States and the Chinese ports and as more and more merchants sought products from the East they became more and more aware of the possibilities of some trade with the islands near China. The Chinese had long been obtaining products from these islands for re-sale to foreign countries. The Americans were attempting to establish themselves as rivals of the Dutch, British and French, who each had particular ports of trade in the orient. Their eyes turned toward the populous islands of Japan. Attempts to begin trade there became more frequent after 1800, though the merchants were still hampered by the Napoleonic wars. Each country was endeavoring through official and unofficial missions to secure the prize or at least to gain entrance to one of the ports just as the Dutch. John W. Foster felt that the opening of Japan was an inevitable consequence of the unlocking of the doors of China. To many people interested in trade there was little distinction between the two places, for the islands and the mainland still were the vast, general Cathay.

Captain David Porter of the United States Navy, who was appointed to the Naval Board in 1815 after seventeen years of active duty is one who had such vague ideas. He is also the first of our "gunboar diplomats" and the first of our naval imperialists. His Journal of a Cruise Made in the Pacific Ocean by Captain David Porter in the U.S. Frigate Essex, which was published

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33 Ibid., p. 444.

in Philadelphia in 1815, is ample evidence of his expansionist tendencies and is certainly a preliminary model of the Report of the Perry expedition. His nationalism, patriotism and pride in the Navy, and his ideas of the manifest destiny of our ships to dominate the waves of the world shine forth in the customary modest terms.

It happened that in the War of 1812 the United States had seventy men-of-war, and of these only one was assigned to duty in the Pacific. This was the abovementioned Essex under Captain Porter. It left in November, 1812, sailed around the Horn, and entered the Pacific - the first United States warship to appear in those waters. Porter cruised the coast of South America and the eastern Pacific, where he captured twelve British whalers. "On November 19, 1813, Porter became America's first naval imperialist by taking possession of the island of Nukahiva which, with its native village and the fort he had erected, he named Fort Madison in honor of the President."[34]

With this as a base he sailed the seas and was assigned another ship, Essex Jr., for his attacks. Both ran into trouble in early 1814. They had entered the port of Valparaiso, Chile, and were soon blockaded by two British sloops of war. In the ensuing battle Porter's ship had its mast shot away and he lost one hundred fifty-four men killed on his two frigates. He was captured by the British with the rest of his men. He was released on parole

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34 Allan B. Cole, "Captain David Porter's Proposed Expedition to the Pacific and Japan, 1815," Pacific Historical Review, IX (March 1940), p. 62.

but later got another command in 1815 for the last days of the War. Before his appointment to the Naval Board he wrote a letter to President Madison, which has been published, dated October 31, 1815, in Washington.[35]

He begins by "getting to the point immediately." In blunt words he proposed himself as one to undertake a voyage of discovery in the North and South Pacific. He points out the need and the advantages of this voyage. Russia, he says, attracted world attention in 1803 by sending out two ships for exploration and making a report. In the past each nation, the Portuguese, Dutch, Spanish, English, and French, had sent great men and had made discoveries. The United States is a great rising nation, and so far it has done nothing. His ideas of the extent of the United States are away ahead of his time, since he has "our shores washed by the Atlantic and by the Pacific." His ideas of distance are those of an age still to come, because he has the United States "bordering on Russia, Japan, and China." His attention was upon Japan. "The important trade of Japan has been shut out to every nation except the Dutch." The time was ripe for us to do what nobody else had achieved, open up the trade of Japan. Moreover, Porter would visit all places in the Pacific not yet explored. While his Journal was published and read, this letter to Madison seems to have been hidden away.

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35 Ibid., pp. 64-65. Mr. Cole points out the history of the letter and shows that it was written to Madison rather than to Monroe as formerly thought. It was used in Du Bow's Review in 1852 and from the remarks about the width of the United States was assumed to have been written after we had extended to the Pacific. There is no explanation of this statement of Porter or of his ignorance of our geographical boundaries and it makes one doubt about the authenticity of the document. Bailey, Diplomatic History of the American People, p. 329, cites Du Bow's Review but does not mention that the said Review was using Porter's ideas to promote a great trade program with Japan.

The trade with the Orient continued but little attention was paid to Japan until the early 1830's when word came from the East that an American crew had been murdered in Formosa.[36] This led to the dispatch of the Robert's mission in 1832 which was designed to make commercial treaties with Cochin China, Siam, Muscat, and Japan, to prevent other incidents of the kind. Edmund Roberts could not make contact with the Cochinese. He got some concessions and agreements in Siam and Muscat. He had no funds to buy presents for the Japanese and thought the expedition too small to impress them and therefore returned home. Outfitted again he went back with the treaties as ratified and with the intention of reaching Japan with similar agreements, but on the way he died in China on June 12, 1836.[37]

A brief account of oriental events is necessary to keep a chronology of the interest in the trade programs gradually tending to open Japan. In 1839 the opening of China began with the Opium War. Morse and MacNair think that the real issue was Britain's attempt to force China to open her ports to all nations and to international trade.[38] To the Chinese this seemed to mean the

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36 Bailey, Diplomatic History of the American People, p. 321.

37 Ibid., 322. In 1837 an American firm, Olyphant and Company, attempted to negotiate a trading agreement with Japan by sending the Morrison on which were some shipwrecked Japanese. The ship had had its armament removed. When it was fired upon by the Japanese at both Yedo and Kagoshima Bays, Captain David Ingersoll decided to abandon the mission. Another such mercy voyage was later made by Captain Mercator Cooper of the whaler Manhattan. This time the Captain was treated with great civility and then told never to land in Japan again.

38 Far Eastern International Relations, p. 114.

opium trade. The Americans seemed to sympathise with the Chinese and public opinion was against the war of aggression. An American squadron was present in the China seas under Captain Lawrence Kearny. The British won the war and made the famous Treaty of Nanking, in 1842 whereby they obtained the port of Hong Kong and forced the Chinese to open five ports to foreign trade and residence. Kearny in the following year got the Emperor of China to grant to American citizens the privileges of other nations and to recognise the United States as a most-favored-nation.

Much has already been written about Caleb Cushing and the Treaty of Wanghia. On May 8, 1843, this linguist, scholar, politician, was appointed first American Commissioner to China. He left the United States in July, 1843, with gifts and instructions and what Bailey quotes as a "childish letter" to the Emperor. He arrived at Macao February 27, 1844, backed by a fleet. He announced that if the Chinese did not receive him it would be an insult to America and a cause of war. This was using what was getting rather common the gunboat method, so the Chinese signed the treaty on July 3, 1844. In this the agreements made by Kearny about favored-nation trade were formally signed. Not much else was gained except that the Chinese agreed to let any American accused of a crime be judged by American officials.[39]

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39 The data in this paragraph are briefed from Bailey, Diplomatic History of the American People, pp. 325-326; Encyclopaedia Britannica, (1949), Vol. 6, p. 902, has pertinent biographical data and a list of the writings of Cushing. For the Chinese side of the Cushing Mission see P.C. Kuo, "Caleb Cushing and the Treaty of Wanghia, 1844," Journal of Modern History, V, (1933), pp. 34-54.

The treaty had to be ratified by the Senate and when this was done President Polk appointed another Commissioner to China who was to take the treaty back to China.[40] He went on the Columbus which was commanded by Commodore James Biddle, who had seen much service on many seas. When the ship arrived at Rio de Janeiro the Commissioner was taken sick and could not continue the voyage. He appointed Biddle as his deputy to follow the instructions to conclude the Chinese treaty and then go to Japan to make another. Biddle completed his work in Macao and in 1846 arrived at Yedo to negotiate with the Japanese. Here a Japanese soldier either "struck or pushed him."[41] He tried to pass off the incident as an accident, but apparently was looked down upon by the Japanese as a weakling. This is one of the reasons why Perry later was instructed to permit no such humiliations.

There was one other attempt being made at this time to get Japan to come out of its shell and to join with the trading nations. The King of the Netherlands used the opening of China as an occasion to urge the Shogun to give up the policy of isolation. This was done in a letter dated February 15,

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40 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 16, 1845-1846, p. 5; Polk's message is dated December 2, 1845.

41 Bailey, Diplomatic History of the American People, p. 330, n. 26; According to Edward M. Barrows, The Great Commodore, New York, 1935, p. 209, Biddle had been assigned to open Japan, which is contrary to the fact that he had been deputized at Rio de Janeiro, and secondly, he anchored off Uraga Bay, not Nagasaki, on July 20, 1846, where he was treated with open contempt by the harbor authorities. Nothing is said about the type of contempt. Charles Oscar Paullin, Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval Officers 1778-1883, Baltimore, 1912, p. 233, says Biddle was pushed when he entered a Japanese launch to conduct the negotiations.

1844.[42] The Japanese government replied that it would not do so, in response on July 4, 1845. Furthermore, between the time of the first letter and of the last, the Mikado, thoroughly suspicious, ordered his coasts to be guarded at all times to prevent "dishonor to the Divine Country."[43] William II, in his letter had called the attention of the Mikado to the great advances in steam power for navigation and had recommended that he establish friendly commercial relations as a certain means of avoiding collisions with other friendly powers. When the suggestion was rebuffed the door seemed permanently closed. Proof of the Japanese hatred or fear of the foreign "devils" soon came in the form of and Imperial edict which was transmitted to the Dutch at Deshima. This forbade foreigners to make charts or drawings of Japanese lands and waters and also forbade any ship, except a Dutch or Chinese ship, to return Japanese sailors who had been shipwrecked. The Dutch were instructed to inform foreign nations of this edict.[44] If the United States was warned to stay away from Japan according to the edict, the warning was filed away for future reference since at the time we were busy with the war in Mexico.

In 1852, however, when word of the forthcoming expedition from the United States to Japan got around, the Netherlands government authorized their East Indian government to send word to the Dutch governor at Deshima,

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42 Hunter Miller, ed., Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America, Washington, 1934, Vol. IV, p. 529.

43 F. L. Hawks, Narrative of the Expedition of an American Squadron to the China Sea and Japan, New York, 1856, Vol. I, p. 63.

44 Ibid.

Jan Hendrik Donker Curtius, to ask the Shogun to appoint a confidential agent for purposes of discussing "the means that Curtius should indicate in order to preserve Japan against the dangers that threatened her."[45] There was also the request from the Dutch that Japan give up her exclusion policy. All this was refused by Japan. The effect of these last two overtures seems to have been a growing fear in the minds of the Japanese of some impending doom and an urgent desire to be prepared for foreign intruders. It is little wonder then that having been warned about steamships and dangers of an unknown nature threatening her, the Japanese were terrified on the appearance of the smoking warships of Perry.

In spite of the edict ordering all to stay away Commander Glynn of the United States Navy visited Nagasaki in 1849 to receive some American seamen who had been shipwrecked.[46] The United States made one more attempt before sending Perry. Commodore Aulick of the East India Squadron was instructed in 1851 to visit Japan to propose the following items for a treaty: the right of United States ships to obtain coal, the opening of one or two ports to commerce, the protection for American property and shipwrecked seamen. Before anything could be accomplished, Commodore Aulick was recalled from the Pacific on November 18, 1851, to make way for Perry.

In conclusion there are several aspects of the opening of Japan which may be pointed out from this chronological survey leading up to the Perry

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45 William Elliot Griffis, Matthew Calbraith Perry, Boston and New York, 1890, p. 277.

46 Payson J. Treat, Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Japan, 1853-1895, 2 Volumes, Stanford University Press, 1932, p. 7.

expedition. The first general idea one gets is that at no time did Japan want to be in contact with occidental tradesmen; she wished at all times to keep them out and there is no indication that she ever permitted her people to travel to Europe for purposes of trade. The only Europeans whom she sincerely welcomed and harbored were the Jesuits and other Catholic missionaries, and the only foreign ideas she allowed were the Christian teachings. Once the priests and the Christian converts had been falsely accused of trading or of attempting to change the Japanese into a trading people the Japanese lords ruthlessly slew them in an attempt to eradicate all vestiges of occidental thought. The Dutch were allowed to remain at Deshima only because they had practically given up their religious faith in the interest of a small and not too profitable trade, but they were not allowed to enter Japan.

The second outstanding point is that treaties were made in China and Japan only at the point of a gun. They were the agreements dictated by outsiders and really had nothing to do with the people. They protected traders after a fashion but they in no way changed the oriental thought or brought the East closer to the West. Japan seemed to be holding an incidental place in the vast orient and seemed just another place that might be visited with no great profit for the merchants, until the coming of steam navigation when its coal might be useful for long trips to the Orient.

There is another aspect of Japan's isolationism and seclusion which is rarely touched by writers on the subject, and this is Japan's right as a sovereign state to remain secluded if she so wished. The common thought is that she should have welcomed foreigners, that she was doing herself no good by staying aloof, that she should progress with the world of trade. Many

arguments are given by those who attempted to enter her ports by the gunboat or other methods and who claimed the right to do so. Because traders, merchants, and whalers needed a port, they judged Japan wrong for not giving it and the considered it their right to force her to do so. As will be seen in the next chapter the Congressmen of the United States condemned the British for placing their flag on islands in all the seas of the whole world, and then proceeded to do the same thing because there was no suitable place left to place the American flag but in Japan. Fortunately, there were Senators who were not trade-mad imperialists to oppose the taking of some Japanese port as the British had taken Hong Kong on the excuse that it was done in the interest of international trade.

CHAPTER II

THE SENATE AND THE PERRY EXPEDITION

The debate in the Senate about the opening of Japan started on March 29, 1852, in a casual way and ended up by bringing out some peculiar aspects of the question. It happened that Senator Stanton, Chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs, was proposing a bill relative to discipline in the Naval Reserve.[1] In order to insure discipline punishment had been meted out with a lash. There had been outbursts against such flogging and the commanders of the squadrons had been consulted. They, including Perry, insisted that they could not hold the men unless this type of physical punishment were resorted to. Stanton's bill was designed to eliminate flogging and substitute some other punishment before the sailing of the East India Squadron.[2] The question suddenly arose: Who was sending an East India Squadron and for what purpose?

To add to the argument against lashing, Venable arose to say that the bill should be acted upon at once, because "We have a fleet about to start for the Mediterranean and another for Japan." The newspapers and the legislators

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1 The Congressional Globe, 1st Sess. 32nd Cong., Vol. 24, Part II, p. 909.

2 Ibid., p. 910.

were now very alert. Who was sending the Navy to Japan? What was the purpose? They recalled that sailors had been driven onto the shores of Japan and had been imprisoned, and they surmised that this might be a war gesture or a threat. Was the President or the Secretary of the Navy responsible for the move? If this were the case, where did the Senate stand in the matter?

Senator Solon Borland of Arkansas decided that the Senate should stand upon its constitutional grounds. Consequently, on March 30, 1852, he rose to submit the following resolution and asked that the Senate consider it immediately:

> Resolved that the Secretary of the Navy be directed to communicate to the Senate the object of the naval expedition recently ordered into the Indian Ocean, and particularly to the coast of Japan, and copies of any instructions that have been given to the commander of that expedition.[3]

To this, objection was made, but Borland gave his reasons. He had seen, he said, the record of a debate in the House, wherefrom he gathered that the expedition was to sail that very day. He thought it important for the Senate and the country to know the object of the expedition, since he felt certain that the Senate would soon be called upon to make an appropriation. However, the vote on the resolution was put off until the following day.

During the interval Borland had consulted with other Senators,

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3 Ibid., p. 928.

so when he took the floor he amended the resolution in two respects.

> Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested to communicate to the Senate the object of the Naval expedition recently ordered into the Indian Ocean, and particularly to the coast of Japan, and copies of any instructions given to the commander of the expedition, if not incompatible with the public service.[4]

Senator Mangum promptly questioned the policy of adopting the resolution at all. Suppose, he reasoned, that the Navy Department did send all the instructions and the President should think it incompatible with the public service and therefore withhold it, the public would certainly think that the fleet was off on a hostile voyage. Mangum wished to pass the issue, by saying smoothly that he thought the Senate presumed the expedition to be going to extend our commercial relations. Then he made what he later called "hasty remarks," which seem to be the key to what was being done.

> It is perfectly well known to every gentleman who has kept his eye on this subject, that when we have had a vessel wrecked on the coast of Japan, the sailors and officers have been treated in a most extraordinary and barbarous manner. Now, Sir, if conciliatory measures shall not change the course of this practice, I will say that I would like to see ten times the force sent there, and a few of what are called "American remonstrances."
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> Sir, you have to deal with barbarians as barbarians. These people, who are isolated from the world, not only socially but politically, are not expected to be regulated by the motives that govern the civilised portion of mankind. I think it a very laudable object to extend our commercial intercourse so far as we can; And in so doing, I think the exhibition of our power there will

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4 Ibid., p. 928 (Italics inserted).

> command respect, and that is what I think this resolution will not do. I think it will require no great stretch of confidence to leave the matter to the proper Department — the Executive portion of our Government.[5]

Mr. Mangum then said the Senate might be gratified to get the set of nicely written instructions, but the resolution would serve no purpose. If it did not get them every antagonistic newspaper in the country would shout that it was an open act of war or a design to make warlike aggressions on an innocent people. Furthermore, it would put all of the nations of Europe on the qui vive if any emphasis is put on the expedition, and "the embroilments which may result will be very dangerous..." However, he said, "we, the men of America, care not for danger. That is the national spirit, and I fear that spirit will become so strong, ultimately, that it will seek danger in that Quixotic spirit which controlled the illustrious Spaniard in seeking it - for the purpose of setting all mankind right, according to our notions." He begged the Honorable Senator to drop the resolution. "Our destiny .... is to ascend to the very apex of human grandeur."[6] Otherwise Mr. Mangum, did not know much of the matter, was indifferent to it, and did not know who had proposed the resolution.

Borland proceeded to give Mangum a lesson in Senatorial responsibility. The Senator from North Carolina, he said, has been going on the supposition that such and such is the case, has supposed what might happen.

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5 Ibid., p. 942-943.

6 Ibid., p. 943.

Borland supposed no such things. He had seen the newspapers and had read the House record only two days previously, otherwise his resolution would have been made sooner. He had a right to know what the expedition was about, and he had a duty to inform himself. He held it to be wrong to conceal such things from the public eye, and from the responsible branches of the Government. The Senators were representatives and agents of the people and they were responsible to the people. There have been rumors, and hints have been thrown out about this expedition and its possible consequences. If the body was to assume the responsibility it would have to be informed. What was the opposition to such a resolution? It could not be because he had never heard such a resolution opposed or rejected. No one, he said, could infer that he intended to cast any reflection upon the conduct of the President of the United States, or to raise even a suggestion that he was doing anything wrong.

A considerable amount of time was spent in trying to hush Borland, chiefly by discussing the right of the people to know all things, including such as might not be to the public interest. Senators Gwin, Shields, Hale, Cass, Rusk, Badger, Bayard, Dawson and Weller expressed their opinions on the resolution, all more or less strongly opposing Borland and asking that his resolution be let lie on the table.[7] Some felt that he was intimating that the expedition was being fitted out for war, which was far from the truth. Gwin of California felt that trade relations between his State and Japan might become

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7 Ibid., p. 943-944.

very important, and the sooner the expedition got to Japan the better it would be. Senator Hale explained how we had an eight million dollar budget for the Navy and how it cost twenty-five to thirty thousand dollars a day to keep the Navy men employed; now we had the ships and the men with nothing to do.

Borland arose not to question the value of such an expedition, but to ask why the concealment and secrecy? Cass indicated the mysteriousness of the mission by quoting the newspapers as saying: "One of the most important expeditions that ever went out from this country is about to go out for some purpose unknown to Congress."[8]

Senator Seward, the masterly diplomat, then took the floor to calm the aroused spirits.

> I do not know that, after due consideration, I shall have any objection to the passage of the resolution. I can only say, that, so far as my own views are concerned now, I am not prepared to vote for it today. The subject is new here; and I think there is a possibility that some injury may be done to the public interest by passing such a resolution hastily, while no possible evil can result from letting it lie over a few days — at least, for a day or two.
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> The Honorable Senator from Michigan has said very justly, that he could not conceive it very proper that there should be such an expedition to Japan. There might be many reasons - I think I could imagine very many reasons - which might well exist, why such an expedition might be very proper, which reasons it might be very proper for the Congress of the United States to understand, and yet which reasons it might not be very wise for the Government of the United States to communicate to the world at the very moment of the transaction. When I look at the position in which we stand in relation to the Pacific — and consider ... that the trade of the East is in the hands of European powers...and

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8 Ibid., p. 945.

> that one nation alone has the monopoly of the trade with Japan, I think that, instead of inquiring why the expedition is now ordered by the Government of the United States to Japan, the question naturally arises, Why have not the United States before sent an expedition to the East? But, as I said, I am not prepared to vote for the resolution today. I may be tomorrow....[9]

Despite the soothing qualities of the speech, when Mangum moved that the resolution be shelved until the next day, the motion was voted down.[10] The Senators then went at the task of amending the resolution. First the vote was to strike out the "instructions" portion. Next the words "communicate to the Senate" were made to read: "communicate to the Senate the force and object of the expedition." Then adjournment followed.[11]

On April 2, Mr. Borland again brought up the resolution, and again there was a postponment after more objections.[12] On April 5, Mr. Owin, submitted the resolution which finally passed:

> Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested to furnish to the Senate, if not in his opinion inconsistent with the interests of the Government, copies of all communications relative to the Empire of Japan, that may be on file in either of the Executive Departments; particularly of the instructions under which Commodore Biddle visited Japan in 1846; his official report of that visit; the communication made by him to the local

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9 Ibid.

10 Ibid., p. 947. The vote was twenty-four to seventeen; of the latter, the yeas, fifteen were Whigs, including Mangum, Seward, and Hamilton Fish. The Nays were all Democrats except Sumner of Massachusetts and Spruance of Delaware.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid., p. 952.

> authorities in Jeddo Bay, and a copy of the translation of the communication made to him on that occasion, together with so much of the communication to the State Department from Alexander H. Everett, then Commissioner to China, as relates to that Japanese document; also copies of any other communication received either directly or indirectly from the Japanese authorities; and such other information that will serve to illustrate the existing relations between the United States and Japan.[13]

On April 12 the President of the Senate, pro tempore, laid the Message of the President of the United States and the documents referred to, before the Senate and these were ordered printed for the use of the Senate.[14] The following day Mr. Borland made a personal explanation of his resolution of inquiry.[15] He had intended, he said, to call it up again, but at the request of other Senators he now agreed to let it lie. He was, however, much opposed to such proceeding and would continue to oppose in the executive session. About two weeks later on April 26, the Senator from Arkansas took back what he had said. He announced that he would not let the resolution lie but would bring up the subject of the expedition to Japan on Wednesday of the following week.[16] This he apparently did not do, since no record of it is printed, and there seems to be no record of the reason.

At fifteen minutes to one on Thursday, July 29, 1852, consideration of the bill "authorizing the exploration and reconnoissance of the courses

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13 Ibid., pp. 966-967.

14 Ibid., p. 1044.

15 Ibid., p. 1054.

of navigation used by whaling vessels in the regions of Behring's Straits, and also of such parts of the China Sea, Straits of Gaspar, and Java Sea, as lie directly in the route of vessels proceeding to and from China," was moved.[17] Washington was undoubtedly hot, and another bill was scheduled for consideration. Senator Robert M.T. Hunter of Virginia argued that the exploration bill be deferred but Senator Gwin said that it would only take a few moments, and that Mr. Seward had a few remarks on the bill. Senator Hunter asked if Senator Seward would consent to put the bill aside at one o'clock, and Senator Seward pledged himself to put it aside at any time he was called upon to do so. Senator Seward then launched into a speech which as printed in the small type and close lines of The Congressional Globe takes up about ten columns. It is as significant as it is long.

Seward opened with a story of hunting, and the thrill of hunting and fishing, and led up to the most noble of sports. "But of a nobler sport and more adventurous sportsmen than Izaak Walton, or you, or Daniel Boone, or even Nimrod, the mightiest as well as the most ancient of hunters, ever dreamed of — the chase of the whale over his broad range of the universal ocean." He

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17 Ibid., Vol. 24, 1851-1852, Part III, p. 1973. Frederick Bancroft, The Life of William H Seward, New York, 1900, 2 Vols. II, 66-68, quotes this speech as the keynote of Seward's Pacific Ocean and Oriental policy. Ray Lyman Wilbur, "Our Pacific Destiny," The Pacific Historical Review, Vol. X (1941), pp. 153-163, argues in a brief address, with Seward, that our love of liberty and love of the seas was to lead inevitably to the breaking down of the barriers of Japan. Undoubtedly, this address anticipated the later Pacific policy of James G. Blaine and McKinley.

then described historically the great men of history who had sent ships out to explore the seas and who had first found whale hunting interesting and profitable; Laplanders, Russians, Norwegians, Basques, and Biscayans. These people had used whale tongues for food, whale oil for all purposes and whalebone for stays and hoops for the dresses of queens.

During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Portuguese, English and Dutch found whales in the North and South Atlantic and in the Arctic sea. The Dutch perfected the harpoon, reel, line and spear. The colonists of Massachusetts soon after arrival took to the seas, and discovered the black whale and other varieties even as far as Africa "and off toward the South Pole." By 1775 the whale fisheries were regarded as northern and southern. "The French employed only a small fleet, the Dutch a larger one of 129 sail. The English had only 96 ships, while the Americans had 132 vessels in the southern fishery, and 177 in the northern fishery, manned with 4,000 persons, and bringing in oil and whalebone of the value of $1,111,000."[18]

He then quoted the words of Edmund Burke on the conciliation of the colonists, giving the famous passage of the hardiness of the American whalers, "pursuing their gigantic game along the coasts of Brazil. No ocean but what is vexed with their fisheries, no climate that is not witness to their toils." ... no people ever carried this perilous mode of hardy enterprise to the extent to which it has been pushed by this recent people." Both Seward's nationalism and his sea approach to future American greatness can be concluded

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18 Ibid., p. 1974

from his words and quotations. He then dramatically quoted an English paper which described the arrival of the first ship flying the flag of America in and English harbor. This was the Bedford that reached the London customs house on February 6, 1783, two months after the preliminary treaty, and it was carrying 587 barrels of whale oil.

The French Revolution, the Napoleonic wars, and the War of 1812 caused a great slump in the American whaling industry. Then the Americans again got into action and by 1824 were leading the British while the Dutch and French were already giving up whaling. By 1847, Seward continued, all nations except ours had virtually given up the "hardy form of perilous adventure" in favor of the Americans. In that year the total number of whalers of the world was about 900 vessels. More than 800 of these were American, totalling 240,000 tons, with a capital of more than 20,000,000, an annual production of $13,000,000. Seward then itemized the dangers and risks involved in the long days and years at sea, and he stressed the need for charts and information of shoals, which would have saved many ships and much money.

Seward did away with the objection that because the whalers were almost entirely from Massachusetts the Federal Government should not subsidize and exploration to favor that State. He pointed out that whaling was a source of national income, since other parts of the country had to make materials which went into the $30,000 cost of outfitting a whaler. What food and oil they took from the sea left our national resources untouched. Besides men trained on the seas in whalers could be most useful in time of war. Thus far, despite this wonderful growth and industry, the Government had done nothing toward encouraging it. Seward next spoke of the reasons behind his remarks

on the history and development of the whaling industry. These prove to be the causes of the Perry expedition.

> Mr. President, I have tried to win the favor of the Senate toward the national whale fishery for a purpose. The whales have found a new retreat in the seas of Ochotsk and Anadir, south of Behring Straits, and in that part of the Arctic ocean lying north of them. In 1848, Captain Roys, in the whale ship Superior, passed through these seas and through the straits, braving the perils of an unknown way and an inhospitable climate. He filled his ship in a few weeks and the news of his success went abroad. In 1849, a fleet of 154 sail went up to this new fishing ground; in 1850 a fleet of 144, and in 1851, a fleet of 145. The vessels were manned with thirty persons each; and their value, including that of the average annual cargoes procured there, was equal to $9,000,000, and thus exceeded by near $2,000,000 the highest annual import from China. But these fleets have been beset by not only such dangers of their calling...but also by the multiplied dangers of shipwreck resulting from the want of accurate topographical knowledge...While many of the deplorable losses were sustained by the fleets of 1849-'50, we have already information of the loss of eleven vessels, one thirteenth part of the whole fleet of 1851.[19]

The Senator from New York said that the merchants, ship-owners, underwriters, and the Navy were concerned about these losses, and that they did not want bounties or government aid, but a general survey. This would not cost much and should be undertaken by the Navy. He argued that the responsibility rested with the Federal Government. The fleet could explore the northern waters until September and when the cold began it could explore the many islands and reefs in the warmer waters to the south. Nobody had ever made such a survey even though ships from New York and San Francisco constantly sailed to

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19 Ibid., p. 1975.

China and the Indian seas. The rulers of the nations in the orient had forbidden explorations of Europeans around their islands under penalty of death. Here Seward could have been referring to the Japanese islands. The danger of death or imprisonment for any merchant or whaling ship crew which might get too near the forbidden shores was an obvious reason why the Navy with its armed ships should make the survey.

Seward then specified the route to be explored. He said that in the fair way to China there was a large island, Ousima, thickly populated and highly cultivated, and that so far no ship had either touched it or sailed around it. It would be worth the whole cost of the expedition if one harbor and a friendly people could be found on that Island. He mentioned the dangerous shoals of the China Sea, the Sea of Japan and the Straits of Gaspar which had to be charted, and those south along Palawan, Cochin China, and various islands including Formosa. To the north "the safety of the whaleman demands that the islands between the coasts of China and Japan, and from them to the Loo Choo Islands, and so on to the Russian possessions, and along them eastwardly to the Behring's Straits, should be surveyed."[20] As far as passengers and mail from California were concerned the distance to China was seven thousand miles, and "yet for want of such a survey as this, you cannot choose or establish a coaling station" for the whole voyage.

The new State of California was brought into the arguments in favor of the survey voyage. California, said Seward, was near the fishing grounds

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20 Ibid., p. 1975.

and her "enterprising citizens are already engaged in this pursuit, and hence-forward the whale hunters of Nantucket must compete with a new rival." California added its demand for charts and maps to that of Massachusetts.

Moreover, Seward added, California loomed as the State with the greatest potential of all. "The commercial, social, and political movements of the world are now in the direction of California." He pointed out that value of the China trade annually was $7,000,000. But California's exports in bullion alone already exceeded $50,000,000. Yet the wonderful region was only in its infancy. Although it was not conveniently accessible because there was no railway over Panama, Nicaragua, or Tehuantepec, and our transcontinental road to San Francisco was only to the Mississippi, nevertheless people from the East and from every State, from South America and from Europe, and from Asia were arriving in California. Separated as it was by foreign lands and mountains the Government is establishing there a custom-house, a mint, a dry dock, Indian agencies, and tribunals of justice.

All this did not happen suddenly. Seward pointed out that for centuries men had been trying to reach the fabled orient, Cathay, China, the East.

> Even the discovery of this continent and its islands, and the organization of society and government upon them, grand and important as those events have been, were but preliminary, conditional and ancilliary to the more sublime result, now in the act of consummation—the reunion of two civilizations, which, having parted on the plains of Asia four thousand years ago, and having traveled ever afterwards in opposite directions around the world, now meet again on the coasts and islands of the Pacific ocean. Certainly no more human event of equal dignity and importance has ever occurred upon the earth.

All this could not happen before; now it is possible to have a reunion of the

races. He gave statistics to indicate that in the three months past sixty-seven ships had brought seventeen thousand Chinese to California and the West Indies, and he did not see how this enevitable trend could be stopped.

His next remarks were most significant because they expressed what he had had in mind for many years and what he had in mind when he as Secretary of State in 1867 arranged for the purchase of Alaska. Seward asked the Senators if they were aware that California, Oregon, and Australia could sustain five hundred million people and that they needed that number to complete their development. Asia already had an excess population of two hundred million which was overflowing into the Pacific area. The United States should be the chief influence in fashioning the ideas of the whole area.

> Who does not see that this movement must effect our own complete emancipation from what remains of European influence and prejudice, and in turn develop the American influence and opinion, which shall remould constitutional laws and customs in the land that is first greeted by the rising sun?
>
> Commerce is the great agent of this movement. Whatever nation shall put that commerce into full employment, and shall conduct it steadily with adequate expansion, will become necessarily the greatest of existing States; greater than any that has ever existed. Sir, you will claim that responsibility and that high destiny for our own country. Are you sure that by assuming the one she will gain the other? They imply nothing less than universal commerce and the supremacy of the seas.[21]

He then pointed to the British empire. No matter where one went he found the British flag. Seward then enumerated all the holdings throughout the world, a told how it was respected and cheered. Nearly all peoples

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21 Ibid., p. 1976.

acknowledged its protection. And what had been the chief agent for this spreading of Empire? Trade and commerce, and the sword. Control by the sword would finally fail because it was too costly. England was our great rival, but the United States was now closer to the Pacific area and had more products than the British. There were two things to fear, Seward stated. The British were using more and more steam ships and these going the long way around the Cape of Good Hope might be able to arrive in the Pacific countries and islands sooner than ours. And if we had islands for coaling stations we would have a great advantage. The other fear was that since California and Oregon were so isolated from our East they might secede and form Pacific empires of their own. Here Seward had in mind the "irrepressible conflict" and the fears of Southern secession.

Seward already had the final draft of the act for which he was speaking, printed and on the desks of the Senators! It read:

> That the President of the United States be, and he is hereby, authorized to cause an exploration and reconnoissance to be made, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, of the track of navigation pursued by whaling vessels in the region of the Behring Straits, and also of such parts of the China Sea, the Straits of Gaspar, and Java Sea, as lie directly in the route of vessels proceeding from Atlantic or Pacific American ports to China and Japan; and that for this purpose the President is authorized and requested to provide one or more suitable vessels, or assign them from vessels now in the Navy, and such officers of the Navy and Army of the United States as shall be necessary; and the sum of $125,000 is hereby appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to defray the expense of carrying this act into execution.
>
> Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, That this act shall continue in force two years.

This address of Seward's has been indicated as significant of his

world view. The Pacific Ocean had long been to him the "theatre of events in the world's great hereafter." His patriotism and his nationalism are clearly shown. England appears as the arch-rival of the United States in world affairs. The "manifest destiny" theme is utilized, as might be expected after the Mexican War had gained the western States. From this viewpoint it would seem that not Perry nor the Senate nor the people of the United States were responsible for the opening of Japan, but only Seward.

Taken as delivered the speech seems to say that there should be charts for the use of whaling and merchant ships. Apparently, all of the Senators did not take the words at their face value. Action on the bill was postponed for July 29. Between that time and August 2, Senator Hunter from Virginia prepared a modified form which Senator Gwin thought would be passed without any objection. The new form read:

> The President of the United States be, and he is hereby authorized and requested to cause an exploration and reconnaissance to be made under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, of the seas in the vicinity of Behring's Straits that are frequented by the whaling vessels of the United States, and also of such parts of the China Seas and the Pacific Ocean as lie in the route of the vessels trading to and from China; and for this purpose, The President of the United States is authorized and requested to provide, either by building or buying, a screw steamer of suitable dimensions, and two small sailing vessels of two or three hundred tons burden, properly appointed, officered, and manned from the Navy; and the sum of $125,000 is hereby appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry into effect the provisions of this act: Provided, That the expense of purchasing, or equipping and the fitting of these vessels, shall not

exceed the sum of the money herein appropriated: And Provided Further, That the appropriation shall be confined to a reconnaissance for nautical and commercial purposes.[22]

The difference between Seward's bill and the second is striking, and Senator Borland, as shall be seen, was quick to notice that something was in the air. First, Japan, as well as the Straits of Gaspar and the Java Sea are omitted from the field of the survey by name, but might be included in the general "Pacific Ocean." Secondly, the President could in the first drafted bill "provide one or more suitable vessels, or assign them from vessels now in the Navy," which would mean that he could actually send the whole Navy. In the second draft the number of ships is specified and limited: he could build or buy "a screw steamer" and two small sailing ships of limited size. Thirdly, in the first instance the ships were to be manned by officers of the Navy and Army, which would certainly make the expedition look very belligerent, while in the second draft the ships were to be officered by the Navy. Fourthly, the first draft states that the act was to continue for two years, and the sum to be spent was $125,000. The second draft was tricky, because the provision limited the sum to no more than $125,000, BUT the clauses here became Section 2 of Public Act LIV, which read: "An Act making Appropriations for the Naval Service for the year ending the thirtieth of June, one thousand eight hundred

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22 Ibid., p. 2041.

and fifty three."[23] Therefore, the Navy actually was allotted the 125,000 for the following ten months instead of the previously stated two years. Moreover, according to the said Section 2, the appropriation did not include armament in the sum: "Provided," it states, "That the expense of purchasing or building and equipping, with the exception of the armament, and of fitting out these vessels shall not exceed the sum hereby appropriated." Fifthly, in the second draft "nautical and commercial purposes" are specified, but in the above Section 2 as finally passed, the words are "naval and commercial purposes."

The bill as proposed brought Senator Borland to his feet. He said that he did not wish to make a speech but that he did not understand fully what the object of this expedition was.[24] He had listened, he said, attentively to Seward's long and learned speech but still did not know the real character and objects of this expedition. "Exploring" the seas meant nothing to him, since

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23 Ibid., p. xxi, appendix. After a diligent search no record was found of the actual vote on this Public Act, as is usually given in The Congressional Globe. The index to the Public Acts says that this one was passed on August 31, 1852, and refers to the proper page, but the Act is columns long and this paragraph is buried among the budget allowances for the Navy. Exactly how this came about cannot be ascertained from the official records.

24 Ibid., p. 2041. Borland evidently did not know that some of the Senators were planning two expeditions, one of which was the Perry expedition directly to Japan, and the other was the exploratory expedition which would do as the bill stated. The latter turned out to be the Ringgold expedition which made the charts of the Pacific; see The Appendix to the Congressional Globe, 2nd Sess. 32nd Cong., Vol. 27, 1852-1853, p. 305-306, 317.

since our ships are always out on the seas, merchant, whaling and naval. "But, Sir, to fit out an expedition for this exclusive and special business is a novel proposition to me." He wanted to know why, wherefore, and how. Is it to seek the haunts of the whale, to join in the chase of the whale? If so, not the Navy but a whaler should do this. He would not vote for any appropriation that would turn the government into fishermen, no matter how big or small the fish. Fishing might be profitable but we "have other fish to fry." He begged some Senator to tell him what this survey was about.

Senator Hunter arose to explain that the purpose was to make charts for whalers and for voyages to China. Possibly, the expedition might discover some island in the Pacific that had coal. One couldn't do much more with the small sum allotted. The expedition would be useful for commercial purposes.

Borland then arose triumphantly. The proposition, he said, was to aid commerce—to use treasury money for the facility and safety of commerce! The Senator from Virginia, said Borland, had opposed every allottment and every bill that proposed the improvement of our inland waterways and harbors. If it were $50,000 to remove some snag to a $500,000,000 trade, he has always been the leading opponent, objecting that the measure would be unconstitutional. He would not vote one dollar for our inland commerce and travel, but now votes for an exploration of far distant and wild places. Borland concluded by asking the Senate to "make a note of it."

To all intents and purposes the Senate had done its duty, according to the ideals of democracy which had been upheld by Mr. Borland. The issue was clear at the end of August, 1852, and a simple exploratory voyage was to be made by three ships, all in the interests of commercial relations. Japan

was apparently out of the consideration. The events in the next five months revealed that other forces were busy shaping the destiny of the United States in the Pacific. A study of the records will reveal "the higher law" that sent Perry to Japan. Attention is first called to the long Report of the Secretary of the Navy, John P. Kennedy, submitted to the President of the United States, Millard Fillmore, under date of December 4, 1852.

The first part of the report deals with the distribution of naval squadrons "deemed necessary for the protection of our commerce." Six of these were out on the oceans cruising for three year periods in the East Indies, the Pacific, the coast of Africa, the coast of Brazil, the Mediterranean, and the coast of the United States. Commodore John H. Aulick had the East India fleet of three ships of war. This was recently reorganized and Aulick was waiting to be replaced by Commodore Perry. Perry had just sailed in the steam frigate Mississippi, and would be followed by the steam frigate Powhattan, and those rapidly being prepared: the line-of-battle ship Vermont, the corvette Macedonian, the sloop of war Vandalia, and the steamer Allegheny. Two store ships had already gone to their stations. Anyone can see that this new squadron is far different from what Congress voted $125,000 to prepare.

The Pacific squadron had been cruising the west coasts of North and South America, and incidentally the Sandwich Islands, for three years and was expected home in January. It was time, the report said, to do something about the African squadron and that along Brazil, since the slave trade was now generally being stopped. The Mediterranean fleet had been usefully busy taking care of our relations with the countries of that area. The Mississippi had been ready for the long trip to the Orient months before, but had been sent

north to look after our fishery interests and is now ready to leave the Atlantic.

The next section of the Report pertains to Explorations and Surveys. If there has been any doubt about the belligerent attitude toward Japan or about the warlike intention of the Perry expedition the words of the Secretary of the Navy will dispel it. It is a remarkable example of what was being done in the name of "amity and commerce," apparently for the good of Japan. It involves the Department of State and foreign powers in some "gunboat diplomacy."

The attention of the Navy Department and the Department of State had been directed toward using "the East India squadron in an enterprise of great moment to the commercial interests of this country - to endeavor to establish relations of amity and commerce with Japan.

> The long interdict which has denied to strangers access to the ports or territory of that country, and the singularly inhospitable laws which its Government has adopted to secure this exclusion, having been productive, of late years, of gross oppression and cruelty to citizens of the United States, it has been though expedient to take some effective measure to promote a better understanding with this populous and semi-barbarous empire; to make the effort not only to obtain from them the observance of the rights of humanity to such of our people who may be driven by necessity on their coasts, but also to promote the higher and more valuable end of persuading them to abandon their unprofitable policy of seclusion and gradually to take a place in that general association of commerce in which their resources and industry would equally enable them to confer benefits upon others and the fruits of a higher civilisation upon themselves.[25]

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25 Ibid., pp. 8-9.

The report then took its note from Seward's speech. The extension of the United States to the Pacific, the needs of California and Oregon, our increased trade with Asiatic nations, the proximity of the whaling ships to Japan, the awakening of China from a lethargy of a thousand years, all these events have

> forced upon people of America and Europe the consideration of the question how far is it consistent with the rights of the civilised world to defer to those inconvenient and unsocial customs by which a nation capable of contributing to the relief of the wants of humanity shall be permitted to renounce that duty; whether any nation may claim to be exempt from the admitted Christian obligation of hospitality to strangers...; and the still stronger case, whether the enlightened world will tolerate the infliction of punishment or contumelious treatment upon the unfortunate voyager whom the casualties of the sea may have compelled to an unwilling infraction of a barbarous law.[26]

The report went on to say that the oriental sentiment of isolation in Japan could not be claimed as a national right in view of world commerce and civilization. The day has come when America and Europe demand the rights of hospitality from Asia and Africa. Christendom declares its rights to the heathen and will bring "innumerable blessings to every race which shall acknowledge its mastery. The Government of the United States has happily placed itself in the from of this movement, and "the expedition which has just left our shores takes with it the earnest good wishes, not only of our own country, but of the most enlightened countries of Europe. The opening of Japan has become a necessity ...." These expressions seem to meet the

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26 Ibid., p. 9, for this and the following quotations from the Kennedy report.

requirements for our feelings of "manifest destiny," "the survival of the fittest," "carrying the white man's burden," and policy of "The end justifies the means."

Secretary of the Navy Kennedy then states that he had appointed "a gentleman in every respect worthy of the trust reposed in him" to this duty. In view of the magnitude of the enterprise and the great expectations of Europe and America "I have thought it proper with your approbation, to increase the force" to be put at the disposal of Commodore Perry, sufficient to meet any emergency. Here he enumerated the ships as above, but added the likelihood of several other ships being present for the opening.

He then explains the means by which the whole voyage was arranged so as to be completely successful. During the months since Borland first objected to the allotment of money for an "exploratory trip," the Navy had taken over completely the Perry expedition. The British, Dutch and French had been consulted for approval of the expedition. "A liberal allowance has been made to the squadron for all contingencies." Perry has been furnished with ample means for defense on land and sea; he is able to procure dispatch ships, transports for food and fuel, and special depots have been established for coal at various points. He was instructed to avail himself of any opportunity to make the survey.

Clearly, the $125,000 assigned by Congress would not take care of all such expenses. Kennedy then explains what was to be done with that sum. "Somewhat allied in character and importance to these projected operations of the Japan squadron, is the expedition now prepared for the survey of the China Seas, the North Pacific, and Behring's Straits." This too would use

the Navy resources, although the sum was altogether inadequate. He explained in detail just how inadequate, and announced that the Navy would set aside its ships for this reconnaissance under Commander Ringgold. This was of course very interesting but does not pertain to the topic of the opening of Japan.

The question now is: Where did the Navy get the authority and the appropriation for the Perry mission? For an answer we must turn to the annual message of the President, Millard Fillmore, to Congress, which was dated December 6, 1852.[27] He gave in paragraph after paragraph our relations with various countries and before passing from this survey of foreign affairs he read a much longer paragraph on our Pacific interests. In this, Seward's reasons are given in brief sentences.

> Our settlements on the shores of the Pacific have already given a great e spects a new direction, t A direct and rapidly-incr p with Eastern Asia. T even unto the Arctic ... ... years been frequented by our whalemen. The application of steam to the general purposes of navigation is becoming daily more common, and makes it desireable to obtain fuel and other necessary supplies at convenient points on the route between Asia and our Pacific shores. Our unfortunate countrymen who from time to time suffer shipwreck on the coasts of the eastern seas are entitled to protection. Besides these specific objects, the general prosperity of our States on the Pacific requires that an attempt should be made to open the opposite regions of Asia to a mutually beneficial intercourse. It is obvious that this attempt could be made by no Power to so great an advantage as by the United States, whose constitutional system excludes every idea of distant colonial dependencies.[28]

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28 Ibid., p. 2.

Here then are the objects of the expedition which seemed to be clear to Americans and Europeans. Next come the authority behind the move of the Navy and the instructions which were given to Perry.

> I have accordingly been led to order an appropriate naval force to Japan, under the command of a discreet and intelligent officer of the highest rank known to our service. He is instructed to endeavor to obtain from the Government of that country some relaxation of the inhospitable and anti-social system which it has purused for about two centuries. He has been directed to remonstrate, in the strongest language, against the cruel treatment to which our shipwrecked mariners have often been subjected, and to insist that they be treated with humanity. He is instructed, however, at the same time, to give that Government the amplest assurances that the objects of the United States are such, and such only, as I have indicated, and that the expedition is friendly and peaceful. Notwithstanding the jealousy with which the Governments of Eastern Asia regard all overtures from foreigners, I am not without hopes of a beneficial result of the expedition. Should it be crowned with success, the advantages will not be confined to the United States, but, as in the case of China, will be equally enjoyed by all other maritime Powers. I have much satisfaction in stating that in all the steps preparatory to this expedition, the Government of the United States has been materially aided by the good offices of the King of the Netherlands, the only European Power having any commercial relations with Japan.

From the official words of President Fillmore one may pick out a few peculiar aspects of the Perry mission. In the first part Fillmore gives the reasons for sending the expedition. First, there was the commerce and the increasing commerce between the West Coast, chiefly California, and the Orient, just as Seward had stated in the speech referred to earlier in this chapter. This was an appeal to the favor of Californians and it had political importance, especially since Seward had mentioned in detail the increasing amount of cheap Chinese labor; if labor could be imported to the West, Negro slave labor would be unnecessary, and this would keep California a free State, with its votes in

the Northern fold and safe from the secession movement.

Second, there is the protection of the whaling industry, about which Seward had spoken at great length. If Japan were opened and its waters were charted the whalers would undoubtedly lose fewer ships, put more in the field and make more money, since they would have not only the Eastern States for their products, but the Western and very possibly new markets in Japan. Politically, this would be of benefit to New England and New York interests, both for the whaling products and for the increasing number of clippers. And this was also Seward's idea.

Third, the United States is the only nation that could safely open Japan; all others are imperialistic and might occupy it; but our constitutional system excluded us as seeking possessions outside our territory, so all other nations would approve if we did it, and thus we, the other Powers and Japan would all profit by the awakening to international trade and amity. These ideas and this argument from expediency are all Seward's.

Next, Fillmore says, "have accordingly been led to order an appropriate naval force...." If he had been "led" to do so from the arguments above, obviously he had been led by Seward's arguments. From the viewpoint of domestic politics the economic imperialists would be satisfied at the possibility of having their investments far from America protected by the Navy. There were others who had to be satisfied: the rabid expansionists, the men who wanted as Seward did a powerful Navy rivaling that of Britain, and the opponents of expansion, the Monroeists. The words in the address "naval force" and "remonstrate, in the strongest language" could satisfy those promoting the Navy and a new vigorous, foreign policy, while the stress on

"friendly and peaceful" and no attempts at "colonisation," could be interpreted as the old American policy. It must be remembered that this event was being prepared after the Mexican War and that there were still desires to take more of Mexican land. Also, the Gadsden Purchase was being prepared. Moreover, there were long debates in the House and Senate over acquiring Canada, Cuba, Jamaica, the Bahamas, and fiery speeches on the pros and cons of over-seas colonisation.[29] Typical of these was one of Senator Hale on January 18, 1853, who thought it a stupid policy to go far off in the Pacific when Britain had our trade tied up by her ownership of land and islands at our borders, which we should own. "Sir, the imagination can hardly conceive of what this country would be - what an era of internal commerce, and of progress, and of prosperity, would open upon this continent, if the Canadas, bordering the lakes upon the north, were united to this Union."[30]

On the international political side the nations of Europe were much alarmed at the Americans and their belligerancy. It is little wonder that they backed a program which would get the highest ranking Naval officer and the newest ships of the Navy far away into the Pacific and thus leave their possessions in and around North America free. And finally, they must have been very happy to know that "the advantages" of the opening of Japan would "not be

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29 Ibid., this whole volume indicates the strong feelings of politicians during the "fitful fifties".

30 Ibid., p. 98. For Seward's position on the annexation of Cuba, see pp. 126 ff. The long debate in the Senate on "The Colonization of North America," pp.118-134, lasting from January 25, 1853, through February 1, and continued elsewhere, involved Senators Cass, Seward, Gwin, Soule, Mallory, and Hale. The debate revolved around Monroeism and "manifest destiny."

confined to the United States" but would be "equally enjoyed by all other maritime Powers."

There are several other aspects of the Perry expedition which, like the preceding Senatorial aspect, have not been thoroughly investigated. The most obvious of these were, first, Who gave Perry his final instructions after Fillmore gave the general authority, and second, What was meant by the ample funds which he had for making the voyage a success? There are certain legal and constitutional points involved in the answers, to say nothing of political string-pulling.

It will be remembered that Perry was given command of the East India squadron in January of 1852 and that a bill was passed for a reconnaissance of the Pacific on August 31 of that year. After this time the new Perry expedition was planned and Perry sailed away on November 24, 1852. Edward Everett was Secretary of State for Fillmore, but he seems to have been absent when the final instructions were made out for Perry. These were written, strange to say not by the Secretary of the Navy but by Mr. Conrad, Secretary of War and Acting Secretary of State. It would take too much time to give the full text of these instructions and hence we must confine ourselves to the excerpts given by Professor Treat.[31] Despite the fact that Professor Treat

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31 Payson J. Treat, Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Japan 1853-1895, 2 Volumes, Stanford University Press, California, Vol. I, pp. 8-9, has the quotations given on this and the next page. Treat cites the 32d Cong., 1st Sess., Senate Ex. Doc. No. 59, pp. 78-79. Serial Number 620.

is the reliable authority on the diplomatic relations of the United States and Japan, he has no references whatsoever to all the materials quoted above from The Congressional Globe.

Treat states briefly the objects of the mission as outlined by Conrad, he says, though they are Fillmore's points: To secure protection for shipwrecked American seamen and property, permission to secure supplies (especially coal), and the opening of one or more ports for commerce. Conrad said that the objects were to be obtained by argument and persuasion, and if this did not convince the Japanese Perry was to state "in the most unequivocal terms that American citizens wrecked on the coasts of Japan must be treated with humanity," and (here Treat quotes his document) "that if any acts of cruelty should hereafter be practiced upon citizens of this country, whether by the government or by the inhabitants of Japan, they will be severly chastised."

This instruction was definitely a threat of war, and was beyond the instructions issued by Fillmore. It must be remembered that the presidential elections had been held and Pierce was to succeed Fillmore. The question is; Was this war threat made with the consent of Fillmore?

The next part of the instruction was:

> as the president has no power to declare war, his mission is necessarily of a pacific character, and he will not resort to force unless in self defense in the protection of the vessels and crews under his command, or to resent an act of personal violense offered to himself, or one of his crews.

What power did Perry have from this instruction? Apparently, he could not wage an aggressive war, but he could start firing in self-defense if he or any one of the men on the ships was touched by any Japanese, or if any

overt act were committed against a ship. He was obviously to be the judge deciding whether the violence was sufficient to start a war.

If it were a question of mere insult, Perry's instructions were that he should be

> courteous and conciliatory, but at the same time, firm and decided. He will therefore, submit with patience and forbearance to acts of discourtesy to which he may be subjected, by a people to sic whose usages it will not do to test by our standards of propriety, but, at the same time, will be careful to do nothing that will comprimit, in their eyes, his own dignity, or that of the country. He will, on the contrary, do everything to impress them with a just sense of the power and greatness of this country, and to satisfy them that its past forbearance has been the result, not of timidity, but of a desire to be on friendly terms with them.

It seems then that Perry was instructed to make a peaceful entry into Japan, but he also had power from the Secretary of War and Acting Secretary of State, to do what the President could not do, issue ultimatums and declare war.

As to the point about the funds given to Perry the records are rather silent until 1855. The first report to the Senate was that with much effort Perry had reached Japan on July 8, 1853.[32] Next, in his message to Congress on December 5, 1853, President Pierce merely mentions that Perry got to Japan but the outcome of his mission was not known.[33]

The Secretary of the Navy, J. C. Dobbin, in his report of December 4, 1854, gives some idea of what transpired after Perry left Japan for Hong Kong.[34]

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32 Appendix to Congressional Globe, Vol. 29, 33d Cong., p. 14.

33 Congressional Globe, 1st Sess., 33d Cong., Vol.28, Part I, p. 9.

34 Ibid., 2nd Sess., Vol. 31, p. 21.

The Commodore found a civil war in progress in China and had to remain in the area for the last half of 1853 protecting American citizens. He found the Ringgold expedition at Hong Kong and as there was trouble with Ringgold Perry relieved him of his command and sent him home on August 9, putting the ships in charge of Captain Rogers. On January 14, 1854, he left Hong Kong and arrived in Yedo Bay on February 13. "By indomitable perseverance and remarkable management he succeeded finally in overcoming the obstinacy and prejudices of the Japanese Government and induced it to enter into a treaty of amity and peace." The treaty was entrusted to Commander H. A. Adams, who left on the Saratoga for the Sandwich Islands where he boarded a faster ship for San Francisco and arrived in Washington on July 10. Commodore Perry's fleet reached Boston on September 1. The Secretary then said Perry and his company deserved great credit, and "a new era seems to be dawning on the world." On this same December 4, President Pierce in his Message to Congress did not even mention Perry.

December 5, Senator John Slidell called for the records of the treaty,[35] and December 27 Senator James M. Mason of the Foreign Relations Committee proposed a bill for compensation for Commodore Perry.[36] This was called up again on February 15, 1855, and was finally proposed on March 2.[37]

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35 Ibid., 1st Sess., Vol. 30. p. 15.

36 Ibid., p. 742.

37 Ibid., p. 1094.

It was

> To reimburse Commodore M. C. Perry of the United States Navy, the extraordinary expenses incurred by him on his recent mission to Japan, and as a consideration for his eminent public services in effecting a treaty of amity and commerce with that Power $20,000 to be received in full of all expenses or other charges incurred by him on that mission.

Then followed an enlightening explanation.

> $15,000 was placed in the hands of Commodore Perry by the Department of State to defray the extraordinary expenses of his mission, but he used only $2,000, and those $2,000 he used in having presents purchased in Paris for the purposes of his mission. The residue he very properly, I think, abstained from using because it would involve the settlement here for the expenditures of an extraordinary character incident to that mission....

Senator Tooms of Georgia wanted to tack on an amendment to include payments to Mr. Schenk and Mr. Pendleton who had opened up trade with Uruguay and Buenos Aires, which he considered as valuable a public service as that of Perry. A debate followed upon this point of combining the grants. In the midst of this Senator Adams arose to oppose the whole idea of making grants, since in his opinion Perry, Schrenk and Pendleton had merely done their duty and had already been paid their wages. Because a man had done his duty more successfully was to him no reason for starting a precedent of paying bonuses to everybody who did what he was paid to do. That a number of Senators were in agreement with this principle is clear from the vote. This was twenty-three to

to twenty-one in favor of the reward.[38]

After this there is no mention of Perry in the Congressional Globe except in the Report of the Secretary of the Navy for December 3, 1855, which states briefly that Commodore Perry was home from his mission and that Commander H. A. Adams had returned to Japan with the treaty as ratified by the Senate and with Townsend Harris as the United States representative in Japan.[39] After this the Senate went into the discussion of the printing of Perry's Report, with which this paper opened. It is strange that President Pierce in his Message to Congress for 1855 and 1856 makes no mention of the great expedition of Perry, though he includes items in our foreign relations which seem far less significant.

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38 Ibid., p. 1095. An act had been passed on August 4, 1854, appropriating money to the Foreign Relations Committee for payment to persons in the diplomatic service according to the judgment of the Committee. Perry's name was mentioned and the act amended to include it. Tooms wanted to amend the amendment to include Schrenk and Pendleton.

39 Appendix to Congressional Globe, 1st Sess., 34th Cong., Vol. 33, p. 15.

CHAPTER III

PERRY'S TREATY AND ITS AFTERMATH

Perry left Norfolk on the Mississippi on November 24, 1852, went to the Madeira Islands then St. Helena in the South Atlantic, then to Cape town and around the Cape of Good Hope to Mauritius, Point de Galle and straight to Singapore. He took the eastern coast route to Macao, Hong Kong, and Shanghai.[1] His next visit was to the Ryukyu or Loochoo (or "Lewchew") Islands between Japan and China and the neighboring Bonin Islands. He had four ships when he anchored at the town of Uraga in the Bay of Yedo on July 8, 1853. Here as is well known with "firmness, dignity, and fearlessness" he refused to leave the Bay, go to Nagasaki, deal through the Dutch, or receive presents unless he gave some also (which he did not have at the time.) In violation of Japanese laws he forced the high officials to receive the letter he carried from President Fillmore.[2] Having thus frightened the Japanese he sailed away after ten days to get supplies, his gifts, and more ships, promising to return in the Spring. Almost every gesture of the great Perry has been described by his

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1 Treat, Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Japan, p. 10.

2 32nd Cong., 1st Sess., Sen. Exec. Doc., No. 59, Serial Number 751, pp. 32, 53-54.

admirers.[3]

As stated before Perry remained in the China waters until January 14, 1854, then sailed for Loochoo, where he heard from the Dutch of the death of the Emperor of Japan.[4] Even though the Japanese asked him to wait until the mourning period was over he boldly went on to Yedo Bay, arriving there on February 13, with three steamships and four others. This fleet and the neglect of their request made the Japanese feel that the expedition meant trouble or even war. The debate about the place where the conference would be held ended in a compromise on Yokohama. There negotiations went on, ending in the much described champagne dinner and joviality. After this the treaty of amity and peace was signed on March 31. Since the treaty stipulated that Simoda was to be one of the ports opened more detailed regulations had to be drawn up. These were signed at Simoda on June 17, 1854. Before entering into a discussion of the whole affair it seems well to give the texts of the treaty and the additional regulations.[5]

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3 Ibid., Hawks, Narrative, Vol I, pp. 303 ff., S. Wells Williams, A Journal of the Perry Expedition to Japan, 1853-1854, in Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, Vol. 37, Part II, and Second Series, Vol. 7, 98-119; Charles O. Paullin, Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval Officers, 1778-1883, Baltimore, 1912, Griffis, Perry, Tyler Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, New York, 1922; Edward M. Barrows, The Great Commodore, New York, 1935; Arthur Walworth, Black Ships Off Japan, New York, 1946.

4 Hawks, Narrative, Vol. I, p. 322.

5 Hunter Miller, Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1942, Vol. VI, 440-442 English, pp. 443-467-Japanese, pp. 468-470-Dutch, Additional Regulations, pp. 470-472-English, pp. 473-489 Japanese.

TEXT OF THE FIRST TREATY BETWEEN AMERICA AND JAPAN, MARCH 31, 1854

Article I. There shall be a perfect, permanent, and universal peace, and a sincere and cordial amity, between the United States of America, on the one part, and the Empire of Japan on the other, and between their people, respectively, without exception of persons or places.

Article II. The port of Simoda, in the principality of Idsu, and the port of Hakodadi, in the principality of Matsmai, are granted by the Japanese as ports for the reception of American ships, where they can be supplied with wood, water, provisions and coal, and other articles their necessities may require, as far as the Japanese have them. The time for opening the first named port is immediately on signing this treaty; the last named port is to be opened immediately after the same day in the ensuing Japanese year.

Note - A tariff of prices shall be given by the Japanese officer of the things which they can furnish, payment for which shall be made in gold and silver coin.

Article III. Whenever ships of the United States are thrown or wrecked on the coast of Japan, the Japanese vessels will assist them and carry their crews to Simoda or Hakodadi, and hand them over to their countrymen appointed to receive them. Whatever articles the shipwrecked men have preserved shall likewise be restored, and the expenses incurred in the rescue and support of Americans and Japanese who may thus be thrown upon the shores of either nation are not to be refunded.

Article IV. Those shipwrecked persons and other citizens of the United States shall be free as in other countries, and not subjected to confinement, but shall be amenable to just laws.

Article V. Shipwrecked men, and other citizens of the United States, temporarily living at Simoda and Hakodadi, shall not be subject to such restrictions and confinement as the Dutch and Chinese are at Nagasaki; but shall be free at Simoda to go where they please within the limits of seven Japanese miles (or ri) from a small island in the harbor of Simoda, makred on the accompanying chart, hereto appended; and shall in like manner be free to go where they please at Hakodadi, within limits to be defined after the visit of the United States squadron to that place.

Article VI. If there be any other sort of goods wanted, or any business which shall require to be arranged, there shall be careful deliberation between the parties in order to settle such matters.

Article VII. It is agreed that ships of the United States resorting

to the ports open to them shall be permitted to exchange gold and silver coin and articles of goods for other articles of goods, under such regulations as shall be temporarily established by the Japanese government for that purpose. It is stipulated, however, that the ships of the United States shall be permitted to carry away whatever articles they are unwilling to exchange.

Article VIII. Wood, water, provisions, coal and goods required shall only be procured through the agency of Japanese officers appointed for that purpose, and in no other manner.

Article IX. It is agreed, that if, at any future day, the government of Japan shall grant to any other nation or nations privileges and advantages which are not herein granted to the United States and the citizens thereof, that these same privileges and advantages shall be granted likewise to the United States and to the citizens thereof without any consultation or delay.

Article X. Ships of the United States shall be permitted to resort to no other ports in Japan but Simoda and Hakodadi, unless in distress or forced by stress of weather.

Article XI. There shall be appointed by the government of the United States consuls or agents to reside in Simoda at any time after the expiration of eighteen months from the date of the signing of this treaty; provided that either of the two governments deem such arrangement necessary.

Article XII. The present convention, having been concluded and duly signed, shall be obligatory, and faithfully observed by the United States of America and Japan, and by the citizens and subjects of each respective power; and it is to be ratified and approved by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and by the august Sovereign of Japan, and the ratifications shall be exchanged within eighteen months from the date of the signature thereof, or sooner if practicable.

In faith whereof, we, the plenipotentiaries of the United States of America and the Empire of Japan, aforesaid, have signed and sealed these presents.

Done at Kanagawa, this thirty-first day of March, in the year of our Lord Jesus Chirst one thousand eight hundred and fifty four, and of Kayei the seventh year, third month and third day."

"When they reluctantly agreed to the treaty provisions for the residence of the consular representative.....they "wanted no women in Shimoda."

ADDITIONAL REGULATIONS AGREED TO BY COMMODORE PERRY AND THE JAPANESE COMMISSIONERS AT SHIMODA.

Article I. The imperial governors of Simoda will place watch stations wherever they deem best, to designate the limits of their jurisdiction; but Americans are at liberty to go through them, unrestricted, within the limits of seven Japanese ri, or miles, and those who are found transgressing Japanese laws may be apprehended by the police and taken on board their ships.

Article II. Three landing-places shall be constructed for the boats of merchant ships and whale-ships resorting to this port; one at Simoda, one at Kakizaki, and the third at the brook lying southeast of Centre Island. The citizens of the United States, will, of course, treat the Japanese officers with proper respect.

Article III. Americans, when on shore, are not allowed access to military establishments or private houses without leave, but they can enter shops and visit temples as they please.

Article IV. Two temples, the Rioshen at Simoda, and the Yokushen at Kakizaki, are assigned as resting-places for persons in their walks, until public houses and inns are erected.

Article V. Near the temple Yokushen, at Kakizaki, a burial-ground has been set apart for Americans, where their graves and tombs shall not be molested.

Article VI. It is stipulated in the treaty of Kanagawa, that coal will be furnished at Hakodadi; but it is very difficult for the Japanese to supply it at that port, Commodore Perry promises to mention this to his government, in order that the Japanese government may be relieved from the obligation of making that port a coal depot.

Article VII. It is agreed that henceforth the Chinese language shall not be employed in official communications between the two governments, except when there is no Dutch interpreter.

Article VIII. A harbor-master and three skillful pilots have been appointed for the port of Simoda.

Article IX. Whenever goods are selected in the shops they shall be marked with the name of the purchaser and the price agreed upon, and then be sent to the Goyoshi, or government office, where the money is to be paid to Japanese officers, and the articles delivered by them.

Article X. The shooting of birds and animals is generally forbidden in Japan, and this law is therefore to be observed by all Americans.

Article XI. It is hereby agreed that five Japanese ri, or miles, be the limit allowed to Americans at Hakodadi, and the requirements contained in Article 1, of these regulations, are hereby made also applicable to that port within that distance.

Article XII. His Majesty the Emperor of Japan is at liberty to appoint whoever he pleases to receive the ratifications of the treaty of Kanagawa, and give an acknowledgement on his part.

It is agreed that nothing herein contained shall in any way affect or modify the stipulations of the treaty of Kanagawa, should that be found to be contrary to these regulations.

In witness whereof, copies of these additional regulations have been signed, and sealed in the English and Japanese languages by the respective parties, and a certified translation in the Dutch language and exchanged by the commissioners of the United States and Japan.

Simoda, Japan, June 17, 1854.

M. C. PERRY,

Commander-in-chief of the U. S. Naval Forces, East India, China, and Japan Seas, and Special Envoy to Japan.*

Hunter Miller, Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1942, p. 440-442 and p. 473-489.

From the words of the treaty and the regulations it seems clear that Perry did not open Japan very much. There was to be peace and friendship between the United States and Japan. The expressions of this were to be limited to two ports, Shimoda and Hakodadi. The Americans could, if the paid prices stipulated by the Japanese officials, get what was necessary for them to continue their journey. The government of Japan could tell them what was necessary (Article VII). If any Americans were shipwrecked the Japanese were to bring them to the two ports. In these places they would be allowed to walk farther than the Japanese permitted the Dutch and Chinese to walk, and they would be far more privileged than any other nation's citizens because there were specified benches on which they might sit. The Japanese promised that if they ever gave any privileges to any other nation they would confer the same advantages on Americans. According to the regulations. One of the revolutionary ideas was that of a kind of extraterritoriality. If Americans violated Japanese laws they would not be killed or imprisoned or tried by Japanese, but put aboard their ships. If an American bought anything in a Japanese shop the article had to be sent to the government office, where the purchaser paid the officials the price stated by the shopkeeper.

Those who have glorified Perry have pointed out the vast significance of his distinguished statesmanship and his magnificant results. They call the treaty a "red letter day in the history of the world."[6] If Japan had not opened her gates she would have been dismembered by Russia, they say. Very few

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6 Bailey, Diplomatic History of the American People, 332.

in the United States realized the significance of the event at the time, even President Pierce made no mention of it in long messages to congress.

It is difficult to evaluate the arguments in favor of Perry from the viewpoint of what might have happened if she had not made the treaty. Russia might or might not have dismembered her, but not at that particular time, since Russia was busy with the Crimea and after that mess had little money or energy to bother about anything. It was a long way through Siberia from St. Petersburg to Japan, and nobody has stated why the Russians would like to take some or all of Japan. The only objects she might have wanted would be wood and coal fueling stations. It can be questioned now whether the opening of Japan was any red letter day from the subsequent history of Japan.

It is doubtful too if Perry set a good example of friendly and peaceful diplomatic patterns. Those who praised him spoke of his tact and dignity and his observance of ceremony, but it seems that this praise came from pro-Perry writers. They could see no fault in the great Commodore. On the other hand, Fillmore and Pierce sent him letters warning him against making a warlike display of power, and they considered his diplomacy good enough only to make a "coal and Wood" treaty and to prevent assaults on shipwrecked Americans. They told him not to take Islands when he wished to take and fortify Loochoo.[7] They did not want him to make a commercial treaty, even though Hawks and others say he was responsible for that great idea. It seems clear that Fillmore gave

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7 Treat, Diplomatic Relations, pp. 18-19; Sen. Exec. Doc., Serial No. 751, pp. 47-49.

explicit instructions which were later changed by the Army and Navy.

Evidence that he intended to frighten the Japanese into signing any kind of treaty because of the disrupted condition of their country is clear. First he wanted an impressive steam fleet. The Japanese had been warned about this by the Dutch, who inimated that he meant trouble for them. Next, in the very first interview he was reliably reported by his followers to have expressed firmly that he would not want the Japanese to treat shipwrecked sailors harshly. The Japanese account of what he said is quite different. What the Japanese understood him to say is in the Diary of an Official of the Bakufu.[8]

> If your country should persist in its present practices and fail to mend them, and if ships are not helped, it will surely be looked upon with hostility. If your country becomes an enemy we will exhaust our resources if necessary to wage war. We are fully prepared to engage in a struggle for victory. Our country has just had a war with a neighboring country, Mexico, and we even attacked and captured its capital. Circumstances may lead your country into a similar plight. It would be well for you to reconsider.

The Lord Rector of the University, Hayashi, speaking for the Japanese delegation, used diplomatic language to call Perry a liar. He is reported to have said:

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8 Treat, Diplomatic Relations, p. 15, sees no threat of war in these statements and simply introduces them by saying: "Perry alluded to the harsh treatment accorded shipwrecked seamen." The Diary is in Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, Second Series, Vol. 7, p. 98.

> If forced by circumstances, we will also go to war; but many of your statements are not true, due, I assume, to the fact that many of your ideas have been created by mistaken reports.

To any unbiased observer these words, if true, are words of war. They are threats on one side and on the other. They are what one Japanese listener understood during the negotiations. It does not seem to indicate any diplomatic talent on the part of Perry, but rather a belligerent spirit. The very entry into the port indicated a war threat. According to Hawks, the men on the ships were thoroughly drilled, the ships were "in perfect readiness" and as they entered the Bay of Yedo, "the decks were cleared for action, the guns were placed in position and shotted, the ammunition arranged, in short, all the preparations made, usual before meeting an enemy."[9] This surely appears to be "gunboat diplomacy" and altogether different from our earlier policy of "amicable relations" as stated by our Presidents from the time of Washington.

That the Japanese were delaying the possible fight until the interior affairs of the country were settled seems clear. They expected to resist the American intruders but had not been able to get their ships. Batteries had been set up to guard the entrances to the Bay of Yedo. Defenses were in progress at five places along the coast. The defense minister, Abe Masahiro, had had the law changed so that large vessels could be built and

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9 Hawks, Narrative, Vol. I, p. 231.

armed.[10] The Dutch at Deshima were told to gather all useful books. Cannon and munitions were being made and troops were being drilled. The war faction was certainly doing all to resist an American entrance, invasion, or war. The conservative faction knew that Japan was not ready, and one might infer that this was the reason any treaty was made at all. When Perry saw the fortifications at Yedo on his first arrival, he reported to the Secretary of the Navy on these fortifications which he thought had been put up to repel the Americans, and he remarked most significantly that "with his augmented force he could penetrate to within three or four miles of Yedo."[11]

What does this mean? Perry saw fortifications of which he was afraid with a small force, and even with a larger force he did not feel that he could completely penetrate, that is he could get to three or four miles of his objective. A number of reasons have been given for his short stay in Yedo Bay: he did not have his presents, he needed fuel, he wanted to give the Japanese time to think over his offer of peace, he wanted to impress them with the display of a larger fleet. But nobody, because he was the great Perry, wants to say that he saw strong evidence of preparations for resistance, that he did not know how strong they were, and that he made a very strategic retreat from what might have been a hornet's nest. Could it be that the Japanese did not fire on him because they were ignorant, as they very probably were, of the

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10 Capt. F. R. A. Brinkley, A History of the Japanese People, New York, 1915, has the account of the preparations for war being made by the Japanese.

11 Treat, Diplomatic Relations, p. 18.

destructive power of these smoking monsters, or because the Dutch had warned them of the belligerency of the Americans,[12] or because they expected more ships to appear or to be ready to attack other places? Could it be that they were delaying to find out if other ships were coming before firing upon Perry? The Japanese according to the eyewitnesses were in consternation, amazement, awe, and fear when the smoking steam ships came into view. Could it be that the observers on the expedition wanted them to be that way, and when they saw the bustle and preparation thought they were afraid, when they might easily have been preparing to resist and hurrying their preparations?

If all was as has been stated under Perry's control as far as the negotiations were concerned, why, one may ask, did he not complete them immediately instead of sailing for the coast of China? The reasons for this move as he reported them are clear. Everybody has considered them as wise. He had to protect Americans during the Chinese revolt, and wait for his gifts and supplies. But he was also awaiting instructions from Washington. He had reported strength in the Japanese harbor. He suggested taking and fortifying Loochoo and using it as a possible base. Did the government interpret this as a base for war movements and attacks? Apparently, some were quite suspicious of Perry's moves. How else can we account for the repeated orders sent to him to remember that his mission was peaceful and that he should not use force unless he were attacked?

G. B. Sansom is of the opinion that Perry would have used force

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12 Sen. Exec. Doc., Serial Number 751, pp. 20-21.

without any scruples if he had been obliged to do so. He says:

> It is clear from the voluminous records of his expedition that he Perry and his government, though their aim was naturally the promotion of American interests, were convinced that they were acting in a most enlightened and benevolent way. Like most Western people at that date, they were thoroughly confident, not to say complacent, as to the rightness of their views and the perfection of their culture. Whether the Japanese liked it or not the West proposed to confer on them the benefits of Western civilization. It was good for them. Perry therefore would have felt no misgivings on moral grounds if he had been obliged to use force. The private records of the expedition are sprinkled with such phrases as the "nobler principles," the "better life" of a "higher civilization" which were to put at Japan's disposal; and in the less lofty language of the official correspondence similar ideas are implicit."[13]

From this viewpoint of carrying the white man's burden Perry was a forerunner and promoter of the idea that led the United States at the end of the century to take the Phillippine Islands.

Backing up this statement Herbert Norman states:

> American Far Eastern policy already showed its peculiar characteristic: namely, the pressure of the future on the present, and the resulting desire to guard the former by providing for it in the present. In this concern to look for harbors and commercial footholds in the western Pacific, Perry and others had plans to take Formosa and the Ryukyu and the Bonin Islands.[14]

Some added ideas of Perry's imperialistic desires and tendencies are given by Livermore.[15] He points out that considerable headway toward American Imperialism had been made during the nineteenth century. American naval

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13 G. B. Sansom, The Western World and Japan, New York, 1950, p.277.

14 Herbert Norman, Japan's Emergence as a Modern State, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1940, p. 40.

15 Seward W.Livermore, "American Naval-Base Policy in the Far East, 1850-1914," Pacific Historical Review, Vol.XIII (June, 1944), p. 113.

officers and diplomats wanted to compete in the Orient with Great Britain. Livermore says that Perry told the Navy Department that Britain had most of the important places in China and in the Orient and that the United States commerce could be saved only by prompt action. (These statements appear in Seward's address as mentioned in the last chapter.) Perry then added that Japan and many islands were left untouched by that "unconcionable government," and that there was no time to be wasted in getting a number of ports. Livermore continues:

> Perry's expedition to Japan in 1853-1854 was undertaken largely in the hope, on the Commodore's part at least, of compelling the Japanese to cede the Lu-Chu Islands to his government for that purpose. It was a great disappointment to Perry when the Pierce administration failed to show any enthusiasm for the project and ordered him to proceed with the business for which he had been sent to Japan. By accepting the American demands for a commercial treaty the Japanese left Perry with no good reason for holding the islands, the permanent occupation of which would have put the United States in an excellent strategic position to dominate the trade routes to Asia.[16]

Other writers favoring imperialism in the Pacific have taken up their pens to praise the vigor and foresight of Perry. Earl Swisher is one of these.[17] He has brought together opinions of many authors to show how Perry was right in view of the present situation in the Pacific. For the present policy he holds the Navy as praiseworthy. But the policy of imperialism was formulated by

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16 Ibid.

17 Earl Swisher, "Commodore Perry's Imperialism in Relation to America's Present Day Position in the Pacific," Pacific Historical Review, Vol. XVI (Feb. 1947), p. 30; Ray Lyman Wilbur, "Our Pacific Destiny," Ibid., Vol. X (1941), pp. 153-163.

Perry, and here Swisher cites Tyler Dennett and S. Wells Williams as his authorities. Williams, who glorifies Perry in his biography, says that Perry "divined the future of America upon the world's seven seas." Swisher then builds up Perry's idea of an extension of American territory across the Pacific, saying "Perry's plan was...strategic control of the Pacific Ocean area and the key points were the Sandwich Islands, the Bonin and Volcano Islands, Great Lew Chew, and Kelung; or in the more familiar terms of World War II, Pearl Harbor, Iwojima, Okinawa, and Formosa."[18] After building up the row of islands from San Francisco to Shanghai according to what he thought Perry was thinking, Swisher then says: "For several reasons this aspect of Perry's mission has been ignored or misunderstood. Perry himself minimized it...."[19]

Perry, the article continues, shared the idea of Manifest Destiny, and from his recent experience in the Mexican War thought we should annex, buy, negotiate for, or take Pacific Islands because we were morally responsible for the uplifting of natives, especially in the places where we would need harbors for packet and merchant ships.[20] On his way to Japan he wrote that the Japanese natives of "this beautiful island" (Okinawa) "would be delighted at our coming amongst them" if it were not for their fear of the rulers. Later he visited this island five times and made a treaty with the officials there. He wrote to Washington asking for instructions to take Okinawa before "some

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18 Swisher, "Commodore Perry's Imperialism," loc. cit., p. 31.

19 Ibid., p. 32.

20 Ibid., p. 33.

other, less scrupulous" country would take it. It should "justly belong to the United States." While waiting for the instructions he put the island under the American flag, because American citizens had been insulted and injured by the Japanese. He would wait for the approval or disapproval of his act.

The Secretary of the Navy found Perry's action "embarrassing" and the President, as we have mentioned above, did not approve of taking any territory because it might be an occasion for war with China, Japan or European powers.[21] This disapproval is regarded by Swisher as not a far-sighted policy, and the government showed itself too indifferent and the American people showed themselves too preoccupied to let Perry carry out his "grandiose scheme." In rejecting the Okinawa or Lew Chew scheme, the Government also rejected Perry's plan to "assume the initiative in Kelung" or Formosa by establishing a settlement there. Moreover, it repudiated his action in the Bonin Islands, where Perry had bought a piece of land in his own name for the use of the Navy. This had been done even though the British governor at Hong Kong protested that the Bonin's were British territory and told the Secretary of the Navy that he would allow no infringement there, but added that we could go elsewhere, meaning Japan, to make "the power and influence of the United States felt...." Perry had planned to get a foothold in the Bonins, then have somebody start a revolution, obtain the control, and make a treaty

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21 Ibid., p. 35.

with the United States through himself.[22]

Incidentally, a word may be said about the attitude of the Californians with regard to Perry's expedition. Seward had mentioned as one of the reasons for a survey of the Pacific the growth and needs of California. Swisher says that Perry had in mind a bridge of islands from California to Shanghai. If Perry was important in any way in the development of California, certainly the historians of California would have given him credit. But H. H. Bancroft in his Works, in the volumes on California written in the 1880's makes no mention of Perry, nor does R. G. Cleland, in his History of California, published in 1930, nor John W. Caughey, California, published in 1940, or History of the Pacific Coast, published in 1933, nor Josiah Royce, in his California published in 1948. Other notable authorities who should have mentioned Perry if they had considered his work outstanding, are The Cambridge History of the British Empire, Volume II, 1783-1870, Albert E. Hindmarsh, The Basis of Japanese Foreign Policy, published in 1936, and Tatsugi Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire, published in 1935. None of these mention Perry. Roy Hidemichi Akagi, writing in 1936, mentions that the Americans came to Japan through necessity, that is because they needed a port of shelter, and Perry got a guarantee that two ports would be opened as refuges and that shipwrecked sailors would not be mistreated.[23] He seems to think

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22 Ibid., p. 37-40.

23 Roy Hidemichi Akagi, Ph. D., Japan's Foreign Relations, 1542-1936, The Hokuseido Press, Tokyo, 1936, p. 18.

that Perry opened the door more to other nations than to Americans, especially to the British and Russians.

Word of Perry's treaty apparently got around to other nations. About a month after Perry left the Asiatic seas British war ships arrived at Nagasaki.[24] These were a squadron of four under Rear Admiral James Stirling who began negotiations with the Japanese officials on September 7, 1854, and on October 18, completed a convention which became a treaty.[25] Before the Crimean War was declared Stirling did not think it worth while to enter Japan because he thought Perry had not accomplished much. After the war was declared he made the move entirely on his own initiative without any authority from his government. He was commander in chief of the British navy in the China seas and he knew that the Russian ships were around Japan. He conceived the plan to open several Japanese ports from which he could attack the Russians and to which he could bring prizes of war. He told the Lord of the Admiralty of the fear of the Japanese of Russian aggression and how this might cause the Japanese to make a favorable treaty with the British.

In his dealings with the Japanese, Stirling first made sure that the War between his country and Russia was known to them. Then he pointed out that they would have British protection if the Russians tried to take any Japanese Islands. He said he would have to have an immediate reply and would not

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24 Ibid., p. 19.

25 Grace Fox, "The Anglo-Japanese Convention of 1854," Pacific Historical Review, Vol. X (Dec. 1941), p. 412; the account of Stirling and the convention runs from page 411 to 434, and it is followed in these few paragraphs.

receive anything from them until they decided. When he was showing impatience and threatened to leave the governor of Nagasaki begged him to wait for an answer, and promised on the sly to let his men land for recreation and let him purchase supplied from the Dutch. So Stirling agreed to wait ten days. During the wait Stirling told the governor how different his entrance and demands were from those of the former visitors, who came as beggars, while he came from a great nation which was asking nothing except a candid answer about the ports.[26]

On October 4 the answer came from Tokyo giving the governor power to act. The governor asked for a list of the requests. Admiral Stirling then presented his terms. It was a convention that was to last for a year. It would make Great Britain a most favored nation, allow three ports to be open to the British and Nagasaki to be opened to Russia and the British, and provided that there would be no hostilities, no supplies or repairing of ships, and no violations of Japanese laws. The governor thought of these points and on October 14 he and the Admiral made the convention of seven articles.[27] By this Nagasaki, Hakodadi, and Shimoda were opened to the British on about the same conditions as those agreed to by Perry. Hence, Stirling got one port more than Perry and Britain was to be considered a most favored nation. Stirling like Perry had a list of harbor regulations to follow except that there was nothing said about birds and animals. Stirling, like Perry, received

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26 Ibid., p. 417.

27 Ibid., p. 418.

praise from the foreign office for his tact and diplomacy, and the Queen acted on his suggestion to send the Emperor of Japan a yacht. In neither case was there a commercial treaty, although Perry's agreement indicated that a consul could be sent after a year and a half.

Russia was quick to join the procession of battle ships going into Japanese harbors. Two months after Stirling's convention and before this was ratified Vice-Admiral Poutiatine, commander of the Russian fleet in the Japanese area, made his fourth visit to Japan.[28] He put in at Shimoda with no impressive power; he had only one ship, and this was disabled. He was actually marooned. Yet he did far better than either Perry or Stirling. By February 7, 1855, he had a signed treaty, which included all of the concessions made to them - three open ports, protection of shipwrecked men, rights to obtain supplies, etc., — and furthermore made Russia a most favored nation, with permission for trade at Shimoda and Hakodate, extraterritoriality, and the right to have a consul at either one of these trade ports.

From all of this it would certainly seem that Japan was opened to trade by first, the Dutch, and next the Russians. The trade treaties of these two nations were before those of the British and Americans. It seems also that the occasion for the opening was not Perry but the Crimean War. From what was done it might be argued that the motive of the Japanese in negotiating the treaties was fear of Russian aggression.

The Dutch at Nagasaki very soon got in contact with their government

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28 Akagi, Japan's Foreign Relations, p. 27; Treat, Diplomatic Relations, p. 23, 28.

and sought to get into the classification of most favored nations.[29] Their Commissioner in Japan, J. H. D. Curtius, signed a convention with Japan on November 8, 1855. This was preliminary to the Dutch-Japanese treaty signed on January 30, 1856, seven months before Townsend Harris arrived in Japan. All of the ancient trade restrictions were removed and grants were made to the Dutch similar to those of Russia with one addition, the Dutch could have two consuls.

According to Bailey, very little attention was paid at the time to Perry and his accomplishment.[30] He mentions the medal struck in Perry's honor by Boston merchants and the set of silver plate given by New York, but he does not mention the $20,000 given by the Senate and the continuation of Perry's commission for life, which seems to mean that Perry was on the Navy payroll until his death in 1858. These rewards, however, were justly due to Perry even though he had made no treaty, since he had been in the Navy for forty-five years, and had been assigned many important tasks, and had been honored before, especially with the command of the first steam warship of the United States, the Fulton II. Naturally, the Pierce administration was not going to give much credit to what the Whigs had done. Many other events, as the Walker expedition, the Crimean War, the Slavery issue, the expansionist movement against Canada and Cuba, and the gold in California caused a loss of interest in what Perry did in Japan, especially since no trade was involved and it would be a year before any commercial treaty could be attempted. In general, "the

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29 Ibid., p. 29; Akagi, p. 27.

30 Bailey, Diplomatic History, pp. 332-333.

Perry pact was in many ways a disappointment - particularly when one considers the display of force that accompanied it."[31]

Before and after the expedition the American press was critical. Nitobe has some of the newspaper comments.[32] The London Sun had about as much interest in the expedition as it would in a balloon soaring "off to one of the planets." The Philadelphia Public Ledger called it a "romantic notion." The Baltimore Sun scoffed at it as a humbug. Others suspected that it had a war intention, a secret attempt to invade Japan.[33] The New York Herald stated:

> The Japanese expedition is to be merely a hydrographical survey of the Japanese coast. The 32 pounders are to be used merely as measuring instruments in the triangulations; the cannon balls are for procuring the baselines. If any Japanese is foolish enough to put his head in the way of these meteorological instruments, of course nobody will be to blame but himself if he should get hurt.

The same paper, on November 29, 1853, further ridiculed the Perry expedition by mentioning in its chronology for July 8, "The American fleet reached Japan and anchored in the Bay or Uraga. Sunday 17 - Commodore Perry sailed from Japan for China to return in the spring for the Emperor's reply."

A final aspect of the expedition may be mentioned, even though it cannot be gone into. This is the question of the opinion of the Japanese on Perry and his opening of Japan. Bailey says in a footnote that "Perry is better known in Japan than in the United States," and he mentions the monument

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31 Ibid., 331.

32 Nitobe, Western Influences in Modern Japan., pp. 43-44.

33 Barrows, The Great Commodore, p. 221.

in Perry's honor erected in the Bay of Yedo. But the significance of the time at which this was done is not given by Bailey. The ceremony took place on July 14, 1901. This was after our occupation of the Philippines and when Japan and the United States were strengthening their relations during the beginings of our economic imperialism. What was the Japanese attitude toward Perry during and after his visits? The pro-Perry writers give the opinion that Japan was grateful because he caused Japan to give up its policy of exclusion, seclusion, and dual government.[34] Nitobe says that the black ships were an object lesson for the Japanese; they made them see the need of giving up the old feudal system and put their "national life on a more scientific basis."[35] Brinkley, however, says that "the desire of the largest number of Japanese was to continue the policy of exclusion." He adds that a few favored the opening of the doors. In other words, Perry started a debate which lasts to the present time. The immediate solution of the question to open or not to open Japan was the decision of the Bakufu: "to make a show of commerce and intercourse and thus gain time to equip the country with a knowledge of naval architecture and warfare...to save funds for a navy and for the fortification of the coast...and evade any definite answer to their requests."[36]

As a final conclusion from the materials presented in this paper we may say that Perry was one of the several instruments in the opening of Japan.

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34 Ibid., p. 222.

35 Nitobe, Western Influences, p. 119.

36 Brinkley, History of the Japanese People, pp. 665-666.

He was aided greatly by the international situation, by the situation within Japan, and particularly by the Dutch, British, and Russian traders and imperialists. He had imperialist ideas. His method was not diplomatic but rather the method of force and aggressiveness. His expedition was backed in the United States by war minded expansionists and it was opposed by Monroeists within both parties but especially the Democratic. The man behind the whole plan seems to have been William H. Seward. His address outlining the policies which he followed from the time he became a Senator in 1850 until his death has been discussed earlier in this paper. How it emerged is outlined by Tyler Dennett, who goes so far as to say that "absolutely no new principles have been added to American Far Eastern policy" since the time of Seward.[37]

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37 Tyler Dennett, "Seward's Far Eastern Policy," American Historical Review, Vol. XXVIII, (1922), p. 45. The same statement occurs in Samuel Flagg Bemis, Ed., The American Secretaries of State and their Diplomacy, Vol. VII, New York, 1928, p. 112. Thornton K. Lothrop, American Statesmen - William Henry Seward, Boston and New York, 1898, p. 435-436, describes how Seward was received everywhere in the East with the highest honors during his tour of the world.

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The thesis submitted by Mary Agnes O'Grady has been read and approved by three members of the Department of History.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts.

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Date

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